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SUMMARY 
The high overnight capital cost (OCC), as well as the large delays and cost 
escalation during construction, make nuclear reactors unattractive for investors. The 
history of nuclear power plants construction in the US shows the necessity to properly 
estimate construction costs and cost uncertainty and contingency. Uncertainties during 
construction can be classified as “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns”. Project 
managers use tools to describe “known unknowns”, while “unknown unknowns”, due to 
their inherent nature, are not knowable. In this work, the cost trends in the various countries 
with nuclear power plants are analyzed. For the US data, the costs and the construction 
schedule of a four-loop PWR (PWR12) are also described in detail. A deterministic 
methodology, called EVAL, was developed to describe the construction of a nuclear power 
and then applied to the Westinghouse SMR. EVAL is based on a methodological approach 
that can evaluate construction cost for an entire Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). EVAL was 
applied to assess and compare different construction strategies for the Westinghouse Small 
Modular Reactor (WEC-SMR) nuclear island and was used to demonstrate and quantify 
the benefits of modularization. For this NPP design, modularization allows a 42% decrease 
in TCIC as compared to standard construction techniques (stick-built construction). EVAL 
was used to evaluate the effect of several decision variables on TCIC through sensitivity 
analyses. Specifically, the effect on construction costs of the discount rate, the size of the 
on-site assembly area, the use of different welding technologies, and testing was evaluated 
for the nuclear island of the WEC-SMR.  
 xvi 
A methodology to perform stochastic analyses through Iman-Conover method to 
account for correlation between costs and activities is also presented. A probabilistic 
assessment is then performed for the construction of a fully-modularized SMR and a stick-
built PWR12. The results show an improved prediction capability of TCIC uncertainty as 
correlations between variables are taken into account. The inputs of the model are then 
modified to be consistent with the cost history in the US for PWR12. The trend in the US 
before 1979 is used to adjust the model inputs to describe a stable nuclear era. The trend 
after 1979 is used to quantify, a posteriori, the impact of “unknown unknowns”, 
representing regulatory changes during construction, resulting in cost and cost uncertainty 
increase.  
With the inputs derived from the pre-1979 data, the TCIC mean value for the 
PWR12-BE is $2.5 B, with a contingency of $995.5 M, which corresponds to 39.8% of the 
TCIC mean. Similar results were obtained for the SMR, where cost contingency is 42.0% 
of the TCIC expected value. Regarding the project duration, the SMR relative standard 
deviation is 9.5%, 10% lower than that of the PWR12-BE. If the unknown unknowns are 
taken into account, the PWR12-BE cost contingency is 128% of the TCIC mean derived 
for the pre-1979 case. For the SMR, the cost contingency relative to the TCIC mean is 
5.1%, higher than that of the PWR12-BE. However, the construction time relative standard 
deviation for the SMR is 11.5%, about half than that of the PWR12-BE (23.2%).  
The analysis shows that the adoption of modular construction does not decrease 
OCC uncertainty with respect to stick-built construction, while it has a positive impact on 
the construction time uncertainty. 
 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Different studies identified nuclear power as a key technology in reducing carbon 
emissions (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014; International Energy 
Agency, 2014). Electricity generation from nuclear power is cost competitive with other 
sources of electricity generation, except where there is direct access to low-cost fossil fuels. 
Levelized Cost Of Electricity (LCOE) for Nuclear Power is heavily driven by capital costs. 
Locatelli et al. (2015) estimate Total Capital Investment Cost (TCIC) to contribute for 50-
70% to LCOE, followed by operation and maintenance (O&M) and fuel cost. For 
Advanced Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) entering service in 2022, studies estimate that 
capital cost will make up 75% of LCOE (International Energy Agency, 2010). 
The nuclear industry is facing many challenges as capital costs of Nuclear Power 
Plants (NPPs) have increased considerably over time. Many studies investigated the NPP 
cost escalation, raising doubts about the future feasibility of Nuclear Power. The Energy 
Information Administration (1986) identified an Overnight Capital Cost (OCC) escalation 
from about $800 /kW in the early 1970s to about $2,500 /kW in the mid 1980s. Cooper 
(2010) determined an increase of OCC from $1,000 /kW for NPPs built in the early 1970s 
to $5,000 /kW - $6,000 /kW (all in 2008 USD) for NPPs built in the early 1990s. Different 
academic studies applied models to this set to predict a 2008-2009 cost escalation as high 
as $10,000 /kW (Cooper, 2010). The increase of NPP capital cost over time is mainly due 
to two reasons: 
• Increasing safety concerns due to the Three Mile Island (TMI), Chernobyl, 
Three Mile Island (TMI), Fukushima-Daiichi accidents caused designs to 
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become more complex, and the standardization of components becoming 
difficult to achieve (Cooper, 2010); 
• Larger reactors were built to achieve economies of scale; however, as the 
size of a project increases, construction tends to be delayed offsetting and 
frequently overrunning the expected savings of larger sizes (Cooper, 2010). 
The purpose of this work is to study the large variation and cost escalation observed 
in the construction of NPPs in the US, starting from the construction schedule (in terms of 
activity costs and durations) of the NPP. A similar methodology was not found in literature. 
First, a construction model was developed to describe the construction of the Westinghouse 
Small Modular Reactor (WEC-SMR) and to perform a set of deterministic analysis on 
TCIC decision parameters. Then, the construction model was used to perform a 
probabilistic analysis to account for the stochastic nature of activities, to calculate the 
project contingency and to estimate the distributions of project duration, OCC, and TCIC. 
The same approach was also used to model the construction of a Westinghouse 4-loop 
“mainstream” PWR (PWR12), and the results were compared to the historical construction 
data in the US. Data for the best estimate “standard” PWR (PWR12-BE) were developed 
by the Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Economic Data Base (EEDB). 
For the WEC-SMR, this study focuses only on the construction of the nuclear island 
(NI), as it represents the main contributor to TCIC. For example, for PWR12-BE, nuclear 
components and structures (that make up the nuclear island) contribute to about 40% of the 
total direct cost (US DOE, 1988). For a smaller integral design, this percentage is expected 
to be higher, 50% or more. The indirect cost may be assumed roughly proportional to the 
associated direct cost, and thus the impact on direct cost will reasonably well represent the 
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impact on the total cost. Moreover, the construction of the nuclear island is the main cause 
of costs overrun and construction delays and, therefore, only the nuclear island portion of 
TCIC was considered in our analysis. It is likely that construction modularization is 
feasible and will reduce costs for non-nuclear-island components, in particular of SMR. 
The work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes previous studies, the basic 
cost definitions that were used in the cost evaluation, and the historical NPP cost trends for 
several countries. In Chapter 3 the objectives and approach of this work are described. 
Chapter 4 describes the deterministic methodology (EVAL) that was applied to the WEC-
SMR. Chapter 5 describes the method used in the stochastic analysis to perform Monte 
Carlo simulations. Chapter 6 contains the deterministic results obtained through EVAL. 




2 BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS STUDIES 
2.1 Definitions of terms as used 
TCIC is the parameter that represents the cost of design, construction, and testing 
of the NPP up to commercial operation. Different methods are used to estimate TCIC. The 
IAEA provides a breakdown of TCIC to different factors (Figure 1) (IAEA, 1999). Base 
costs include costs associated with the equipment, structures, installation and materials 
(direct costs), as well as the engineering, construction and management services (indirect 
costs). Supplementary costs include spare parts, contingencies, and insurance. Owners 
costs include the owners’ capital investment and services costs, escalation and related 
financing costs. The fore costs or overnight costs consist of the base costs, the 
supplementary costs and the owners’ capital investment and service costs. Financial costs 
include escalation, interest during construction (IDC) and fees. Fore costs, escalation costs, 
IDC and fees define TCIC. 
 
Figure 1 – TCIC breakdown according to IAEA code of accounts (1999) 
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2.1.1 Direct and indirect cost 
Direct costs are the main contributor to TCIC. They include direct construction cost 
plus pre-construction cost (site preparation) (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007; 
Rothwell and Ganda, 2014). They include the cost of equipment, material and labor needed 
for the construction of the NPP. The value of direct costs (DC) is calculated summing the 






where Ct represent the cash flow associated with an expenditure related to equipment, 
material or labor, t the time period and LT the number of time periods (project duration). 
Eq. 1 is based on the assumption that a construction schedule is available. A construction 
schedule relies upon a Part Breakdown Structure (PBS) and a Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS), which often are not available at early stages of a reactor development. Indirect 
costs (IC) can be expressed as a percentage (in) of direct costs, as: 
 𝐼𝐶 = 𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝐷𝐶 (2) 
For SMRs, Rothwell and Ganda (2014) sets the coefficient in to 10%. Cost 
estimates of other reactor designs use higher percentages of indirect cost over direct cost 
(Holcomb et al., 2011). Base cost, expressed as the sum of direct and indirect costs is then: 
 𝐵𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 ∙ (1 + 𝑖𝑛) (3) 
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2.1.2 Supplementary and Owner Costs 
Supplementary cost includes transportation and shipping costs, spare parts and 
supplies as well as costs for the core first loading. These costs are often neglected in the 
cost estimates (Holcomb et al., 2011). 
Owner’s cost includes costs that are owner’s responsibility, such as capitalized 
operations, capitalized supplementary costs, and capitalized financing costs. For SMRs, 
Rothwell and Ganda (2014) estimate owner’s cost as $200 M plus 5% of the direct cost. 
Owner’s costs (OC) and overnight capital cost (OCC) can be then calculated as: 
 𝑂𝐶 = 𝐵𝐶 ∙ 0.05 + 200𝑀 (4) 
 𝑂𝐶𝐶 = 𝐵𝐶 ∙ (1 + 0.05) + 200𝑀 (5) 
Owner’s costs can be approximated as directly proportional to the base cost and, 
therefore, the direct cost. Under this approach, the overnight capital cost is: 
 𝑂𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 ∙ (1 + 𝑜𝑐) (6) 
where oc indicates the percentage of owner’s cost over base cost. For an SMR with a base 
cost of $1 B, Eq. 6 becomes 
 𝑂𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 ∙ (1 + 0.35) (7) 
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2.1.3 Escalation costs and interests during construction 
Escalation reflects the change of cost of equipment, labor and material over time 
during the construction of the NPP. The Generation-IV International Forum guidelines 
suggest setting it to zero, unless otherwise justified (Economic Modeling Working Group, 
2007). Interest during construction (IDC) is the cost of financing OCCs during the 
construction period. It is equal to the difference between value of the expenditures at the 
end of the project and the value of the expenditures at the beginning of the project. It 
represents the cost of capital needed to sustain expenses during construction. Under the 
assumption that the length of the project is known a priori, IDC can be calculated as 
(Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007): 
 
𝐼𝐷𝐶 = $ 𝐶% <
1




where LT is the number of time periods (project duration), Ct is the expenditure in period t 
and r is the weighted average cost of capital (discount rate) over one period (e.g., month). 
The Generation IV International Forum guidelines state that the 5% cost of capital “is 
appropriate for plants operating under the more traditional regulated utility model where 
revenues are guaranteed by captive markets, while the 10% cost of capital “would be more 
appropriate for a riskier deregulated or merchant plant environment where the plant must 
compete with other generation sources for revenues” (Economic Modeling Working 
Group, 2007). All cash flows (transactions) are assumed to take place at mid-periods. Cash 
flows (Ct) are made of expenditures associated to direct costs and expenditures associated 
with indirect and owner’s costs. 
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 𝐶% = 𝐶%,CD + 𝐶%,ED,FD  (9) 
Direct costs have a cash flow profile that is determined by the construction 
schedule, while indirect costs and owner’s costs are assumed to be uniformly distributed 
during the construction period. Under this assumption, the cash flow associated to indirect 
and owner’s cost in each period is calculated as: 
 𝐶%,ED,FD =
0.05 ∙ 𝐵𝐶 + 200𝑀
𝐿𝑇  
(10) 
The calculation of IDC through Eq. 8 assumes that the cash flows and the lead time 
LT are known a priori at the beginning of the project. However, at the beginning of 
construction, both these quantities are unknown. Changing the subscripts, Eq. 8 becomes:  
 𝐼𝐷𝐶 = 𝐼𝐷𝐶CD + 𝐼𝐷𝐶ED,FD =
=$[𝐶', 𝐷𝐶(1 + 𝑟)% − 1]
&'
%(@





where the first term represents the IDC due to cash flows associated to direct costs, and the 
second term the IDC associated to indirect and owner’s costs. Assuming that 𝐶',ED,FD 	is 
uniformly distributed such that 𝐶',ED,FD = (𝐼𝐶 + 𝑂𝐶)/𝐿𝑇 the second term of Eq. 11 















[(1 + 𝑟)&' − 1]
𝑟  
(13) 
And the exponential expression can be approximated with a second order 
expansion, as: 
(1 + 𝑟)&' ≈ 1 + 𝐿𝑇 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝐿𝑇(𝐿𝑇 − 1)(𝑟R/2) +		… (14) 




≈ 𝐿𝑇 + 𝐿𝑇(𝐿𝑇 − 1)(𝑟/2) (15) 
Using Eq 16. in Eq.13 and simplifying: 
𝐼𝐷𝐶ED,FD ≅ (𝐼𝐶 + 𝑂𝐶) U
(𝐿𝑇 − 1)𝑟
2
V ≅ 𝐿𝑇 ∙ (𝐼𝐶 + 𝑂𝐶) ∙ (𝑟/2) (16) 
Applying the same methodology to IDCDC, it can be shown that:  
𝐼𝐷𝐶CD ≅ 𝐿𝑇 ∙ (𝐷𝐶) ∙ (𝑟/2) (17) 
Therefore, Eq. 11 becomes: 
𝐼𝐷𝐶 ≅ 𝐿𝑇 ∙ (𝐷𝐶 + 𝐼𝐶 + 𝑂𝐶) ∙ (𝑟/2) = 𝐿𝑇 ∙ (𝑂𝐶𝐶) ∙ (𝑟/2) (18) 
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Substituting the expression for OCC expressed by Eq. 7 into Eq. 18, we obtain: 
𝐼𝐷𝐶 ≅ 𝐿𝑇 ∙ [𝐷𝐶 ∙ (1 + 0.35)] ∙ (𝑟/2) (19) 
Eq. 19 shows that IDC is directly proportional to OCC, and it highlights the 
importance of DC over the other cost items. However, Eq. 19 is obtained assuming that the 
cash flows associated to the direct cost, indirect cost, and owner cost are constant during 
the construction period. A more accurate calculation of IDC is obtained utilizing the real 
direct cost cash flow during construction. Assuming a constant cash flow for IC and OC 
and substituting Eq. 16 into Eq. 11, IDC is then: 
 
𝐼𝐷𝐶 =$K𝐶',CD(1 + 𝑟)% − 1L
&'
%(@
+ 𝐿𝑇 ∙ (𝐼𝐶 + 𝑂𝐶) ∙ (𝑟/2) (20) 
TCIC is calculated summing OCC (Eq. 5) and interests during construction (Eq. 
11), as: 
 𝑇𝐶𝐼𝐶 = 𝑂𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝐷𝐶 (21) 
2.2 The code of accounts and the PWR12-BE 
The code of accounts was originally developed in the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) EEDB Program Code of Accounts (US DOE, 1988), proposed as evaluation tool 
by C.R. Hudson (Hudson, 1986), and further popularized in the guidelines for economic 
evaluation of bids, by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (IAEA, 1999). The 
code of accounts allows to break down main costs (Total Capital Investment Cost, Fuel 
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Cycle Cost, Operation and Maintenance) to individual systems and items. Accounts are 
assigned a numeric sequence and increasing levels of detail are tracked by adding digits to 
the code.  
The PWR12-BE represents a traditional four-loop PWR plant, with a core thermal 
power of 3417 MWth (US DOE, 1987c). In the US, a total of 33 Westinghouse four-loop 
PWRs were built (US NRC, 2018). Costs for the plant were prepared in 1978 by EEDB, 
averaging actual cost incurred in the construction of several nuclear power plants (NPPs), 
itemized with a great level of detail according to the Code of Accounts. For each account, 
the cost of equipment, site labor and site material is provided. The latest version of the 
account cost items were released in 1987 (US DOE, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c), and are 
summarized in Holcomb et al. (2011) along with the amounts converted to January 2011 
US dollars (USD). The cost data from  Holcomb et al. (2011) was extracted, and industry 
experts at Westinghouse Electric Company performed a “sanity check” of the cost items 
(Mack, 2016). The equipment cost of account 222 (Main heat transfer transport system) 
was increased by $100 M (in 2011 USD) to match the current market and supply chain 
data. Similarly, the equipment cost of account 227 (Reactor instrumentation and control) 
was increased by $75 M (in 2011 USD) and construction supervision on site (from 
Holcomb et al. (2011)) was increased by $250 M (in 2011 USD). The accounts cost and 
their percent contributions to the total cost are shown in Table 1. Unfortunately, the cost of 
the NSSS is not provided in the EEDB analysis. as a single line item as “procurement 
costs”, and it is a substantial fraction of the total direct cost of NPPs.  
Table 2 shows the main PWR12-BE accounts, with a cost breakdown into factory 
equipment, site labor and site material costs (in 1987 USD).  
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Table 1 – Accounts with differing cost basis and their percent contributions to the 
direct costs (Holcomb et al., 2011) 
Account  Cost % Cost 
211 Yardwork 59,982,046  2.56% 
212 Reactor Containment Building 155,606,497 6.63% 
213 Turbine Room and Heater Bay 55,565,592 2.37% 
214 Security Building 3,268,692 0.14% 
215 Primary Auxiliary Building and Tunnels 44,333,149 1.89% 
216 Waste Processing Building 34,481,564 1.47% 
217 Fuel Storage Building 23,709,846  1.01% 
218 Other Structures 104,838,447 4.47% 
221 Reactor Equipment 197,406,910  8.41% 
222 Main Heat transfer transport system 252,881,006  10.78% 
223 Safety systems 94,361,424  4.02% 
224 Radwaste Processing 50,261,777 2.14% 
225 Fuel Handling and storage 29,121,984 1.24% 
226 Other Reactor Plant Equipment 112,143,627  4.78% 
227 Reactor Instrumentation and Control 148,253,449  6.32% 
228 Reactor Plant Miscellaneous items 17,885,460  0.76% 
231 Turbine Generator 321,562,255  13.71% 
233 Condensing Systems 69,556,766  2.96% 
234 Feedwater Heating system 56,613,122  2.41% 
235 Other turbine plant equipment 53,575,665  2.28% 
236 Instrumentation and control 16,450,109  0.70% 
237 Turbine plant miscellaneous items 19,310,160  0.82% 
241 Switchgear 28,671,080  1.22% 
242 Station service equipment 48,392,131  2.06% 
243 Switchboards 4,917,355  0.21% 
244 Protective equipment 10,227,327  0.44% 
245 Electric structure and wiring 53,524,039  2.28% 
246 Power and Control wiring 49,442,606  2.11% 
251 Transportation and Lifting equipment 14,385,192  0.61% 
252 Air, water and steam service systems 107,155,789 4.57 % 
253 Communication equipment 15,396,111  0.66% 
254 Furnishing and Fixtures 6,566,362  0.28% 
255 Waste water treatment equipment 6,795,322  0.29% 
261 Structures 10,398,528  0.44% 
262 Mechanical Equipment 68,941,569 2.94% 
 TOTAL 2,345,982,958 100.0% 
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Table 2 – PWR12-BE accounts (1987 USD) (US DOE, 1987a) 
  Factory  equipment Site Labor Site Material Total 
21 Structures and Improvements 22,529,313 113,513,274 64,701,510 200,744,097 
22 Reactor Plant Equipment 312,545,773 48,997,016 14,422,059 375,964,848 
23 Turbine Plant Equipment 173,515,672  41,962,684 8,300,008 223,778,365 












30,642,472 15,280,100 3,058,393 48,980,965 
 Total direct cost 590,602,457 277,150,551 109,739,890 977,492,898 
Account 22 costs, adjusted by WEC experts, are shown in Table 3. The NSSS costs 
were allocated to other subaccounts according to the percentages shown in Holcomb et al. 
(2011). The main component contributing to direct cost is the main heat transfer system 
(Account 222). The system includes main coolant pumps, pressurizer and steam generation 
system (primary heat exchangers, intermediate piping). Account 221 includes the Reactor 
Pressure Vessel (RPV). Safety systems are allocated to Account 223.  
The PWR12-BE direct cost, with accounts modified by WEC experts, is $2.59 B, 
and the indirect cost is $1.47 B (Table 4), which corresponds to 67.0% of the direct cost. 
Therefore, for the PWR12-BE in is equal to 0.67, and Eq. 3 becomes: 
 𝐵𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 ∙ (1 + 0.67) (22) 
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Table 3 – PWR12-BE account 22 subaccounts (1987 USD, from US DOE (1987a), 
adjusted by WEC experts, with NSSS allocation from Holcomb et al. (2011)) 
  Factory 
equipment 
Site Labor Site Material Total 
220A Nuclear Steam Supply (NSSS) - - - - 
221 Reactor Equipment 72,574,428 3,763,592 5,914,859 82,252,878 
222 Main Heat transfer transport system 98,369,396 6,367,615 630,075 105,367,086  
223 Safeguards systems 33,159,421 5,480,770 677,069 39,317,260 
224 Radwaste Processing 16,160,526 4,012,887 768,994 20,942,407 
225 Fuel Handling and storage 11,170,495 857,891 105,774 12,134,160 





53,391,092 7,707,179 673,999 61,772,270 
228 Reactor Plant Miscellaneous items - 4,273,080 3,179,195 7,452,275 
 TOTAL 312,545,773 48,997,016 14,422,059 375,964,847 
The owner’s cost breakdown is shown in Table 5. The total direct cost contributes 
to OCC for a total of $338.92 M, which corresponds to 7.8% of the base cost. Under the 
assumption that the owner’s cost is directly proportional to the base cost, it can be 
calculated as:   
 𝑂𝐶 = 𝐵𝐶 ∙ 0.078 (23) 
The resulting OCC is $4.68 B and can be calculated through Eq. 24. 
 𝑂𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 ∙ (1 + 0.67) ∙ (1 + 0.078) (24) 
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The PWR12-BE construction schedule was derived by US DOE (1987c) and is 
presented in Figure 2 and the project duration is 7.56 years. IDC is calculated through Eq. 
12 using a cost of capital of 10%. The resulting TCIC is $6.74 B. 
Table 4 – PWR12-BE Indirect cost accounts (2016 USD, from Holcomb et al. (2011)) 
  Home office Site labor Site material Total 
31 
Home Office 
Design services 533,953,685  - - 533,953,685  
32 
PM/CM at 
home office 31,555,397 - - 31,555,397  
33 
Design services 
at site - - - - 
34 PM/CM at site - 16,199,022  5,893,212 22,092,234  
35 
Construction 
Supervision - 470,727,702  18,033,175  488,760,877  
36 Field Indirect 165,318,277  241,268,139  228,811,851  635,398,267  
37 
Plant 
Commissioning 29,949,849  - - 29,949,849  
 
Total Indirect 
Costs 760,777,209  728,194,863  252,738,237  1,741,710,309  
Table 5 – PWR12-BE preconstruction and operations cost accounts (2016 USD, 
from Holcomb et al. (2011)) 




- 6,645,480  - 6,645,480  
41-49 Capitalized 
operations cost - 332,274,000  - 332,274,000  
 Total owner’s 




Figure 2 – PWR12-BE construction schedule (derived from US DOE (1987c)) 
2.3 Historical capital cost trend in the US 
The Energy Information Administration (1986) collected the nuclear power plant 
construction costs (in 1982 USD) and construction times of 75 units that started 
construction in the 1966-1977 timeframe in the US. The data was extracted and integrated 
with information of additional 26 reactors from Koomey and Hultman (2007), which 
reports construction costs (in 2004 USD), to expand the data to 101 reactors in the US. The 
reactor type and NSSS design of each plant were taken from US NRC (2018). The collected 
data include, among other things: reactor name, reactor type, NSSS design, power load, 
overnight cost, construction start and end date. Koomey and Hultman (2007) report the 
reactor name and construction date of additional 15 reactors, for which only construction 
times were collected due to lack of cost data. The collected data includes cost and 
construction duration of 32 Westinghouse four-loop PWRs, of the same design as PWR12-
BE, and the construction time (but not cost) of an additional Westinghouse four loop PWR 
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(Indian Point 2). The costs from the two references were escalated to January 2017 USD 
using the Consumer Price Index (US Department of Labor, 2017a). The analysis of the 
historical data shows a cost escalation over the years. The goal of this work is to analyze 
the historical information on completed plants, not only to understand what has occurred 
but also to improve the ability to evaluate the economics and construction risks of future 
plants.  
The Energy Information Administration (1986) presented the cost and construction 
times estimates reported by utilities at the beginning of the projects and at different stages 
of completion (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 100% of completion). Data on total estimated 
construction costs was submitted quarterly by utilities, and both the actual and estimated 
cost data were reported in the dollar amount of the year the funds were expended. As the 
data is not uniform and therefore not comparable, financing costs were removed by the 
costs, and all costs were expressed in constant dollars (mid 1982 USD), using the regional 
Handy-Whitman index. The methodology to convert “as expended” dollars to “constant 
dollars” of a given year, is presented in detail in the reference. The OCC was then converted 
to 2017 USD using CPI. The OCC of the 101 reactors is shown in Figure 3 as a function 
of the NPP power load, while the power-specific OCC ($/kW) as a function of the NPP 
power load is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3 – OCC of US power plants as a function of power load 
 
Figure 4 – OCC per unit power of US nuclear power plants as a function of power 
load 
Figure 5 shows the NPP OCC as a function of the year of construction end. The 
data reveals an observable cost escalation for the reactors completed in the timeframe, 
especially after the Three Mile Island accident of March 1979. Nuclear reactors completed 
before 1979 have a OCC mean of $1,606.1 /kW (2017 USD), 2.5 times lower than the ones 
of reactors completed after 1979, which is $5,945.6/kW (Table 6). The OCC relative 

























































construction ended after 1979. The Energy Information Administration (1986) estimated 
that approximately 75% of the $2,400 /kW (in 1982 USD) increase in real costs can be 
attributed to increases in the quantities of land, labor, material, and equipment. The authors 
found that, for both equipment and commodities, industry regulations were found to be 
major drivers of the cost increase. The remaining 25% of the increase is due to increases 
in the real financing charges, escalation in the rate of increase in the real prices of land, 
labor, material, and equipment during the construction period, and increases in construction 
times. 
 
Figure 5 – OCC of US power plants by construction end date 
Figure 6 shows the historical OCC as a function of the construction duration. The 
data indicates a positive correlation between the project cost and the time required for 
completion. It is important to note that the OCC does not include the financing cost, but it 
is only the sum of all cash flows during the project, expressed in the same year. In other 
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positive correlation between project “real” cost and time indicates the effect of time related 
managerial difficulties and regulatory changes over the construction period on cost.  
 
Figure 6 – OCC of US power plants as a function of construction duration 
Figure 7 shows the construction duration of the 116 US power plants as a function 
of time. Regarding the project duration, reactors completed in the pre-1979 phase have a 
mean of 7.8 years and a relative standard deviation of 51.9%, while reactors completed 
after 1979 have a mean project duration of 10.6 years (1.4 times higher) and a relative 
standard deviation 23.3%. 
Table 6 – OCC and construction duration of US power plants 
 Pre-1979 Post-1979 
OCC  
($/kW) 
µ 1,606.1 3,945.6 
σ/µ 36.0% 51.1% 
Duration 
(years) 
µ 7.8 10.6 






























Figure 7 – Construction duration by construction end date 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively show the OCC and project duration of PWR12 
completed in the US between 1973 and 1996, as a function by the final year of construction. 
For the plants completed before 1979, the OCC mean is $1,934.1 /kW, with a relative 
standard deviation of 30.2%, while the plants completed after 1979 have an OCC mean of 
$4,478.2 /kW and an OCC relative standard deviation of 42.3%. Regarding the 
construction duration, the pre-1979 plants have a mean of 7.6 years and a relative standard 
deviation of 19.5%, while the post-1979 plants have a mean of 13.2 years and a relative 
standard deviation of 23.2%. The means and relative standard deviations of OCC and 
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Figure 8 – OCC of US PWR12 by construction end date 
 
Figure 9 – Construction duration of US PWR12 by construction end date 
Table 7 – OCC and construction duration of US PWR12 
Historical Pre-1979 Post-1979 
OCC  ($/kW) µ  1,934.1  4,478.2 
σ/µ 30.2% 42.3% 
Duration 
(years) 
µ 7.6 13.2 
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In Energy Information Administration (1986), the authors found a positive 
correlation between the utilities real project cost and construction time. The average 
estimated and realized overnight cost and construction times of NPP are shown in Table 8 
and  
Table 9, respectively. Over the construction process, on average the reactors 
analyzed in the timeframe were subjected to an OCC increase of 215.6% and a construction 
time increase of 93.7%. The paper suggests that utilities did not perceive that plants with 
longer construction times were more difficult to manage and build and were more highly 
affected by regulatory changes. The data reveals that, although the utilities did increase 
their construction times and cost estimates as work on the plants proceeded, they still 
tended to underestimate the OCCs and construction times, even at times approaching the 
project completion. 
Table 8 – Average estimated and realized OCCs of nuclear power plants by year 






Estimated costs at different stages of completion 
($/kW) 
 
  0% 25% 50% 75% 90% Realized Increase 
1966-1967 11 298 378 414 558 583 623 109.1% 
1968-1969 26 361 484 552 778 877 1,062 194.2% 
1970-1971 12 404 554 683 982 1,105 1,407 248.3% 
1972-1973 7 594 631 824 1,496 1,773 1,891 218.4% 
1974-1975 14 615 958 1,132 1,731 2,160 2,346 281.5% 
1976-1977 5 794 914 1,065 1,748 1,937 2,132 168.5% 
Average        215.6% 
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Table 9 –Average estimated and realized construction times (months) of nuclear 






Estimated times at different stages of completion 
(months) 
 
  0% 25% 50% 75% 90% Realized Increase 
1966-1967 11 52 56 65 76 82 91 75.0% 
1968-1969 26 55 63 72 83 91 107 94.5% 
1970-1971 12 59 77 92 97 110 132 123.7% 
1972-1973 7 65 87 96 107 115 131 101.5% 
1974-1975 14 68 93 105 117 123 132 94.1% 
1976-1977 5 74 92 95 97 100 112 51.4% 
Average        93.7% 
The reports show that the correlation between actual costs and actual construction 
times was, in part, the result of events and regulatory changes that occurred after the cost 
estimates were prepared. This fact is more likely to be true especially for those estimates 
that were prepared early in the construction period. Thus, the lack of any correlation 
between estimated construction time and estimated costs was partly due to the inability to 
foresee future events and regulatory changes. 
In the report, the authors also analyzed the effect of learning on the NPPs 
construction, both considering the cumulative industry experience and the of the 
construction firm. Regarding the experience of the constructor, the authors found that the 
experience of the external constructor did not considerably affect either the construction 
times or the costs. the analysis also shows that, with all other factors held constant, utilities 
that built their own plants experienced costs that were 35% less than the costs experienced 
by utilities that used outside contractor managers. The meaning of this finding is that 
utilities that managed their own projects were better able to control costs than those that 
did not. However, for utilities acting as their own construction manager, the authors did 
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not find any noticeable construction time reduction. This result indicates that, for this case, 
although utilities may have been able to gain some cost benefits from a better 
understanding of the construction process, they did not gain the same benefits by building 
the plants faster than their nonutility constructor counterparts. The report points out two 
counter acting causes contributing to the non-reduction in the project construction times. 
First, utilities that manage their own construction are believed to be better able to monitor 
and control costs and "construction times”, which should result in shorter construction 
times. However, a utility that manages its own construction has access to information about 
the value of the plant (i.e., demand) that an external constructor would not have or would 
ignore in making decisions, resulting in longer construction times.  
Zimmerman (1982) gives a further explanation on the causes of the cost reduction 
in case the construction management is held by the utility. For non-utility constructors, the 
author argued that more experienced constructors are able to charge the same price as less 
experienced ones and keep the cost savings as profits. On the other hand, utilities that do 
their own construction must pass the cost savings resulting from greater experience on to 
ratepayers in the form of a lower cost plant, since regulation prevents them from keeping 
the savings as profit, resulting therefore in lower actual construction costs. 
The causes of the cost escalation in the United States can be found in the adoption 
of different designs, poor standardization of components, and changes in regulations after 
the Three Mile Island accident. The stricter regulatory oversight increased cost overruns 
by increasing the labor costs through the extra requirements for supervision and 
compliance, and because of alterations requested changes after a design was completed or 
construction of a reactor has started (Ganda et al., 2015). At this date, two two-units NPPs 
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are under construction in the U.S., in Georgia (Vogtle, units 3 and 4), while the construction 
of the units in South Carolina (V.C. Summer, units 2 and 3) was abandoned. The units for 
both sites are Westinghouse AP1000, a large pressurized water reactor design being 
constructed through modularization. As of January 2016, the completion of the units in 
Vogtle is 39 months delayed, and the project estimated cost for the two units is about $21 
B, 49 percent higher than the certified initial cost of $14.1 B (Georgia Power Service 
Commission, 2013). Before being canceled in July 2017, the VC Summer plant was 
delayed and the cost was projected to be $16 B, 78% higher than the initial estimate of $9 
B (Downey, 2017). The main issue initially lied in the construction of the basic foundation, 
not in the modules manufacturing, and the delays in construction were mainly due the 
laying of concrete and rebar. One of the main construction companies (CB&Is Stone and 
Webster, earlier acquired by Shaw Group), did not have any experience building nuclear 
plants or with modularization. As Shellenberger (2017) states, “Vogtle builders struggled 
to create the special materials required for the plant as well as with documentation to meet 
NRCs stringent standards”. In addition to a poor management, construction inexperience, 
and over regulation, the causes for the cost increase also lie in the “deliberate foot-dragging 
to raise costs by US plant builders and module manufacturers both in the US and China” 
(Shellenberger, 2017). The most recent status (as of March 2017) reveals that even higher 
cost overrun may be related to modular construction; however, the issue is not necessarily 
in the concept itself but in the inexperience of the manufacturer. Moreover, after 9/11, NRC 
introduced new design requirements after the plant design had been completed, which led 
to redesign and cost increase (Hals and Flitter, 2017). 
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2.4 Historical capital cost trend in France 
France has the second largest fleet worldwide (58 reactors) and, until the recent 
construction of the EPR, it was identified as a success (Grubler, 2010; Rangel and Leveque, 
2012). The construction cost of the French nuclear power plants was released in 2012, due 
to a request from the Prime Minister to the national audit agency Cour de Comptes. In the 
same year, the agency released a report that collected all the data concerning the actual 
construction of the 29 twin-units reactors installed in France (Cour des Comptes, 2012). 
Before the release of this report, historical construction costs of nuclear plants in France 
were estimated by Grubler (2010), who indirectly examined the EDF financial data 
released in the period from 1972 to 1998. Both data sets were analyzed and compared by 
Rangel and Leveque (2012), which also reports the Cour des Comptes costs. The French 
reactors are of different design types: the CP0, CP, CP2, P4, P’4 and N4. In the Cour de 
Comptes analysis, the reactors are divided into three paliers (levels), based on the reactor 
power load. The first palier includes reactors with power load between 917 and 954 MW 
(CP0, CP1 and CP2), for a total of 34 reactors. Although these reactors have similar 
capacity, they slightly differ in the conception of their intermediary cooling systems. In the 
second palier, there are the reactors with power load between 1362 and 1382 MW (P4 and 
P’4 type), for a total of 20 reactors. These reactors differ in the layout if the structure that 
contains the fuel rods and the circuitry. In the last palier, there are the reactors having a 
power load between 1560 and 1561 MW, which belong to only one type (N4), for a total 
of 4 reactors. This design differs both in capacity and in the conception of the steam 
generators, primary pumps and command room. A detailed description of the paliers and 
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reactors types can be found in Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (2010). Types CP0, CP1, CP2 
and P4 are Westinghouse licensed designs. 
The Cour des Comptes (2012), reports the construction costs converted and 
escalated from the French Franc (FF) to the value of 2010 EUR. For illustration, the costs 
in 2010 EUR, extracted from Cour des Comptes (2012), were escalated to 2017 EUR using 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area (European Central 
Bank, 2017). The costs were then converted to 2017 USD using the average yearly euro-
dollar exchange rate in the period from December 2001 to December 2016, calculated from 
the yearly exchange rates taken from OFX (2018). The resulting early average exchange 
rate is 1.24 USD/EUR. The data obtained through this method has to be interpreted with 
caution, as the multiple currency conversions (FF to EUR to USD) and cost escalations are 
a source of uncertainty. However, useful insights can be learned. The absolute and power-
specific OCCs are shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, respectively. In both plots, the three 
paliers form three separate clusters.  
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Figure 10 – OCC of French power plants as a function of power load (twin units) 
 
Figure 11 – OCC per unit power for French power plants as a function of power 
load (twin units) 































































Figure 12 – OCC per unit power for French power plants by construction end date 
(twin units) 
The cost of NPPs over time shows a slight escalation, reason for which the French 
nuclear program is often taken as a good example by the nuclear industry (Ganda et al., 
2015; Lovering et al., 2016). The source of the success of the can be found in a particular 
political/technocratic framework that, despite may not be replicated elsewhere, it is worth 
investigating. The authors found the key to the French success in the limited number of 
institutional actors: the government, the nationalized utility EDF, and the state nuclear 
R&D organization CEA. The small number of institutions involved, allowed them to act in 
a well-coordinated way (Ganda et al., 2015; Grubler, 2010). Finon and Staropoli (2001) 
identify five key factors of the success of the French program: 
1. A strong political support; 
2. A state-owned electricity monopoly (EDF) endowed with engineering resources; 
3. A highly concentrated electromechanical manufacturing industry; 
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5. A high regulatory stability and efficient co-ordination resulting from long-term 
organizational arrangements.  
A sign of the success of the French nuclear program can also be seen in the 
construction time, which is much shorter than the US case (Figure 13) 
 
Figure 13 – Construction time of French reactors as a function of the year of grid 
connection (Grubler, 2010) 
The mean construction time is 76 months, much lower than the mean of 114 months 
in the US reactor sampled size shown in Section 2.3. Grubler (2010) finds the main drivers 
of the French shorter construction schedules in the standardization of reactor designs and 
the rigorous quality and cost control performed by EDF. Standardization requires 
continued and dedicated efforts to produce positive effects in the long term that, in France, 
was guaranteed by the particular environment. As Rangel and Leveque (2012) argue, the 
learning effect that in France is present for same reactor types is rooted in the idea of 
standardization. In fact, as Ganda et al. (2015) explains, “standardization helps reducing 
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the modifications during the construction phase, induced both by the regulatory turbulence 
and engineering instability.” 
However, as the EDF determination to standardize started decreasing over time, 
together with the interruption of the nuclear program, costs and schedules started to 
increase, as the construction of the new EPR designs shows. Currently, four EPRs are under 
construction: one in Finland (Olkiluoto 3), one in France (Flamanville 3), and two in China 
(Taishan 1 and 2). In Finland, the project started in 2003 and was scheduled to be completed 
in 2010 (Areva, 2003). The project was delayed multiple times and, in 2017, the project is 
scheduled to be completed in 2019 (Reuters, 2017). The original fixed-price contract for 
the Olkiluoto EPR was for €3 B in 2003, which corresponds to a cost prevision of 2,356 
€/kW (in 2017 EUR). The costs were revised multiple times, and the last estimates 
(released in 2012) are for €8 B (Nuclear-news, 2012), which corresponds to a cost of 5,195 
€/kW (in 2017 EUR).  
Similarly, the Flamanville EPR started construction in 2007 and was scheduled to 
begin operation in 2012 (World Nuclear News, 2007). The final construction schedule was 
released in July 2017 by EDF, which plans to complete the project in November 2019 
(World Nuclear News, 2017). The initial cost of the reactor increased from the expected 
€3.3 B (in 2007 EUR), equivalent to 2,377 €/kW (in 2017 EUR), to €10.5 B in 2015, 
equivalent to 6,696 €/kW (in 2017 EUR) (World Nuclear News, 2017). This construction 
cost is almost four times the 1,697 €/kW of the last N4 nuclear reactor built in France 
(Civaux, Figure 12). 
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2.5 Historical capital cost trends in other countries 
Lovering et al. (2016) carried out an extensive analysis of nuclear reactor capital 
cost trends in several countries. However, the data sources referenced in the paper for 
Japan, Korea, Canada and West Germany were not retrievable. As a consequence, the 
plotted OCC plots in Lovering et al. (2016) were digitalized and the capital costs as a 
function of the construction start date were extracted to calculate cost means and standard 
deviations.  
The nuclear reactors capital cost trend in Japan is shown Figure 14, and it is made 
of three phases (Lovering et al., 2016). In the first construction phase, from 1960 to 1969, 
reactors were imported from American and British companies. The Japanese nuclear 
history started with 10 MW boiling water reactor and a 159 MW gas-cooled reactor. In the 
first phase, the reactor size increased between 300 and 700 MW, causing a cost decline of 
82% (16% annualized). In the second phase, from 1970 to 1980, the Japanese industries 
took over the construction and manufacturing of reactors, and reactor size also grew to an 
average of 950 MW. The overnight construction cost increased by 100% (8% annually). In 
the third phase of nuclear power construction in Japan, from 1980 to 2007, costs remained 
constant, with an annual change between -1% and 1%. Considering only the last era of the 
Japanese nuclear industry (Figure 15), the OCCs averaged ¥ 313,488 /kW (2010 JPN), with 
a relative standard deviation of 23.1%.  
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Figure 14 – OCC of Japanese nuclear reactors by construction start date (Lovering 
et al., 2016) 
 
Figure 15 – OCC of third phase Japanese nuclear reactors by construction end date 
(extracted from Lovering et al. (2016) 
The Canadian cost trend is shown in Figure 16. The data shows a sharply declining 
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can be due to consistency in builders and manufacturers, the smaller reactor sizes, or that 
reactors were almost always built in pairs close in time (Lovering et al., 2016). The 
calculated mean and relative standard deviation of this data are $2,950.7 /kW (2010 CAN) 
and 21.3%, respectively.  
 
Figure 16 – OCC of Canadian nuclear reactors by construction start date (Lovering 
et al., 2016) 
The cost experience in West Germany follows a similar pattern as the other Western 
countries (Lovering et al., 2016). In a first phase, Germany experienced a cost decline of 
63% (6% annualized). In the following phase, between 1973 and 1983, costs by 200%, or 
a 12% annually. West Germany reactors have an estimated OCC mean of €1,772.7 /kW 
(2010 EUR) and a relative standard deviation of 43.2%. 
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Figure 17 – Overnight Construction Cost of West Germany nuclear reactors by 
construction start date (Lovering et al., 2016) 
The cost data of the Republic of Korea, shown in Figure 18, is different than for the 
other countries presented in this work. South Korea entered the nuclear market much later 
than US, France, Canada, Germany, or Japan, and skipped the early, small-scale 
demonstration phase. South Korea went straight to importing a large commercial reactor, 
a 558 MW Westinghouse design, which began construction in 1972. Then, South Korea 
continued to import several reactor designs from American, French, and Canadian 
companies, building 9 reactors between 1972 and 1993. In this era, costs fell approximately 
25% (2% annualized). Korea also started to domestically develop nuclear reactor design, 
the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP), based on designs from Westinghouse, 
Framatome and Combustion Engineering, and it was later re-designated as the OPR-1000. 
Twelve reactors of this standard design began construction between 1989 and 2008, and 
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their costs declined in a stable manner, with a 13% cost decline (1% annualized). Overall, 
from the first reactor built in 1971, costs fell by 50% (2% annually), in contrast to every 
other country presented. The data, extracted from Figure 18, has a mean of 
₩2,823,773.6/kW (2010 KRW) and a relative standard deviation of 25.4% The main cause 
of surprising cost decline in the Korean nuclear reactors history can be identified in the 
adoption of a single, standardized design, a standard construction of plants, standard 
operation and standard regulation, which allowed small changes during the construction 
phase (Lovering et al., 2016; Shellenberger, 2017; World Nuclear Association, 2017). 
 




3 OBJECIVES, SCOPE AND PROPOSED APPROACH 
To the issue of NPP capital cost escalation over time, the industry and the scientific 
community proposed a range of solutions. One solution consists on the use of 
modularization as a construction technique, which is intended to improve construction 
efficiency as well as standardization of components (Barry, 2009; Lapp and Golay, 1997; 
N. Town, 2015; Nuclear Energy Agency, 2000; US Government Accountability Office, 
2010). Another solution lies in the adoption of reactor of lower power level, such as of 
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) that, together with the adoption of modularization, are 
associated with lower capital risks and are less likely to be delayed as being characterized 
by a smaller size and simpler design (2015; Gollier et al., 2005; Kuznetsov and Lokhov, 
2011; Locatelli et al., 2014). In this chapter, a literature review of both proposed solutions 
is presented.  
3.1 Modularization and off-site learning 
Modularization is a construction technique that allows a better standardization of 
components, shortening of construction time and lower labor costs. Modularization 
consists of the decomposition of the whole plant into a number of standardized modules 
that allow factory fabrication. In the nuclear industry, modularization consists of moving 
the activities that are part of the NPP construction from the on-site construction location 
(reactor hole) to a different location, which can be on-site (assembly area) or off-site 
(factory). A schematic of the process is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 – Modular construction process 
The benefits of this process can be described through the 1-3-8 rule of thumb that 
was developed in the shipbuilding industry (Barry, 2009; US Government Accountability 
Office, 2010) based on actual observed data. The 1-3-8 rule describes the labor time 
reduction due to a different performance site, as 1, 3 and 8 represent the required labor time 
to perform the same task in the factory, in the on-site assembly area and in the on-site hole, 
respectively. The shorter times are due to environment conditions (e.g., temperature 
controlled, sufficient space availability) that allow activities to be performed more 
efficiently. As tasks are performed in a shorter time, the amount of labor required to 
perform the tasks is also lower, with a subsequent reduction in cost. Modularization has an 
effect on the construction activities as well as on the testing activities. Through 
modularization, functional testing and system testing can be shifted from the installation 
stage (end of construction) to the fabrication and assembly stage, with time and cost savings 
that can be estimated through the 1-3-8 rule. These testing activities can be performed at 
the end of the fabrication process and once the modules have been assembled into a super 
module. This process also allows a higher degree of parallelism, as these activities can be 
performed in parallel during the construction process. Despite the 1-3-8 rule of thumb was 
derived by the shipbuilding industry, it can be applied to the nuclear industry. Ship 
construction and nuclear construction are characterized by similar environments (with 
lower availability of space) and components (large high-tech modules). Despite the 
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similarities in the two industries, the factors 1, 3 and 8 that describe the ship modular 
construction might be different for NPP construction but will be used in this study as the 
best available values and to demonstrate the methodology. 
If the entire nuclear island is built according to the modular construction technique, 
TCIC is expected to be lower than if built using the standard construction techniques (e.g. 
stick-built construction). Another advantage that is a direct effect of the module fabrication 
in a factory is that quality has been proved to be higher compared to the quality achieved 
at the construction site (Barry, 2009; US Government Accountability Office, 2010). 
Improved quality improves worker safety, schedule and cost, in addition to having a 
positive impact on maintenance costs, since it reduces the probability of failure of 
components. The reason for improved quality includes specialization of workers, earlier 
detection of weld defects and better welding due to improved environmental conditions. 
Moreover, factory manufacturing and standardization of components are believed 
to increase the effect of learning. For factory fabrication of standardized components, the 
improvements in the manufacturing processes are retained by the manufacturer. As a 
consequence, the learning rate is higher and NOAK plants are reached earlier as compared 
to stick-built construction. The benefit of learning may be questioned, since in the United 
States costs of stick-built reactors have risen during the year, as shown in Section 2.3.  
3.2 SMRs 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uses the acronym to denote small 
and medium-sized reactors. IAEA defines as small those reactors with an electrical output 
less than 300 MWe and medium with an electrical output less than 700 MWe. According 
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to this designation, 139 of the 442 commercial reactors operating in 2009 worldwide are 
SMRs (Ingersoll, 2009). However, most of these reactors are scaled-down versions of large 
reactors. In the United States and in other parts of the world, on the other hand, the acronym 
stands for small modular reactors, and is used to describe deliberately small reactors, built 
according to modularization of components. In 2014 there were more than 45 SMR designs 
under development in 13 countries (IAEA, 2014). Because of the assumed validity of the 
economies of scales principle, historically the unit power of reactors designed and built has 
been increasing, from a few hundred MWe to 1500 MWe and more. The capital cost per 
unit power of a nuclear reactor is expected to decrease with power, due to the rate reduction 
of unique set-up costs in investment activities and the more efficient use of raw materials 
and the exploitation of higher performances characterizing larger equipment (Carelli et al., 
2010). However, the economy of scale applies only if the reactors are very similar in 
design, as it has been the case in the past but not today, where small modular reactors have 
different designs and characteristics than those of large reactors. (Carelli et al., 2005). 
Applying the economy of scale principle to derive SMRs capital costs from those of large 
reactors, is equivalent to assuming that SMRs are the same as large reactors except from 
size, which can be misleading. In fact, due to their smaller size, SMRs exhibit several 
benefits that can be hardly replicated by large reactors. These benefits have been largely 
reviewed in literature (Hayns and Shepherd., 1999; Miller, 2005; Schock et al., 2001). 
Carelli et al. (2007b) and Petrovic et al. (2012) compared capital costs of a pack of four 
335 MWe SMRs to a monolithic 1340 MWe reactor. In case the only economy of scale is 
considered, the OCC per unit power ($/kWe) of the SMR would be 70% higher than the 
large plant. Once other factors are considered (multiple units at a single site, learning, 
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construction time, match to supply and demand, and simplification in design), the pack of 
four SMRs has a capital cost only 5% higher than the large reactor. Other studies suggest 
that SMRs can “effectively compete in future electricity markets if their capital costs are 
controlled, favorable financing is obtained, and reactor capacity factors match those of 
current light water reactors” (Shropshire, 2011). Despite the benefits associated with 
SMRs, some experts predict higher costs per kW of capacity than currently operating 
reactors (Abdulla et al., 2013; Anadón et al., 2012). However, since no SMRs have been 
manufactured, it is not possible to reliably evaluate these arguments (Ramana and Mian, 
2014a). As a consequence, work has to be done by stakeholders and policy makers to focus 
on developing the supply chain and addressing licensing issues (Locatelli et al., 2014; 
Ramana and Mian, 2014a; Sainati et al., 2015). However, other authors point out that cost 
is not the only issue that needs to be addressed by nuclear power. Safety, waste, and 
proliferation are key problems that need to be faced, and the adoption of SMRs to reduce 
cost may not address the other issues, or even make one or more of the other problems 
worse (Ramana and Mian, 2014b). 
In the following sections, we analyze the factors that contribute to the capital costs 
of SMRs, giving particular emphasis to the comparison of capital costs of SMRs to the 
capital costs associated with conventional large reactors. 
3.2.1 Fabrication in factory and modularization 
Modularization, which has been extensively covered in Section 2.1, is applicable 
to both small reactors and large reactors. Mitenkov et al. (2007) show that 30-35% cost 
savings were achieved in the construction of a nuclear propulsion system with unified 
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equipment and largely factory-made structures delivered to site. However, the design of 
SMRs embodies technical specifications (e.g. the integral layout, size reduction) which are 
not applicable to large reactors and allow a higher number of modularized equipment 
(Locatelli et al., 2014) (Carelli et al., 2010). As a consequence, benefits of modularization 
are believed to be higher for SMRs than for large reactors. 
3.2.2 Simplification of design 
SMRs are characterized by a simpler design, which is enhanced through the use of 
intrinsic and passive safety characteristics, resulting in a reduced number of components, 
especially active. An important effect of design simplification on capital costs is related to 
the amounts of required commodities (such as steel or concrete) during fabrication. In fact, 
as a consequence of their compactness, SMRs have a commodities index (m3/kW) 
comparable and in some cases lower than that of large plants (Bari et al., 2015). The 
simplification of the design has the effect to lower the operation and maintenance costs 
(Carelli et al., 2007a). Because of the simplification of the design and smaller size, authors 
believe that engineering additions required to enhance security may be intrinsically less 
expensive in SMRs (Carelli et al., 2007a). 
3.2.3 More units on site and on-site learning 
The possible deployment of multiple SMR units at a single site must be taken into 
consideration, as sharing infrastructure, systems and services may result in a decrease of 
some fixed costs. Another factor that has to be taken into consideration is learning, for 
which a NOAK plant has a lower cost with respect to a first-of-a-kind (FOAK) plant 
because of the lessons learned in the construction and deployment of earlier units. M. D. 
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Carelli (Carelli et al., 2007a) estimated that learning is reached after 5-7 units. Therefore, 
considering a 350 MWe SMR plant, the NOAK is reached after 2100 MWe, while for a 
1400 MWe large plant it is reached after 8400 MWe. This has the effect that reaching the 
NOAK point earlier, 18 more SMR units can take advantage of learning before the fleet of 
large plants is built. The number of reactors that have to be constructed in order that the 
benefit from learning would compensate for the economies of scale may need to be large, 
depending on the learning factor (Ramana et al., 2013). 
3.2.4 Construction time 
Another parameter that has an important impact on total capital investment cost is 
construction time. In particular, an increase in time schedule affects the following: 
• Labor costs; 
• Rent fees for building infrastructures (e.g. special cranes); 
• Cost Escalation; 
• Interest during construction. 
The intrinsic characteristics of SMRs such as their smaller size, simpler design, 
increased modularization and the higher degree of factory fabrication allow achieving a 
shorter construction time, with subsequent lower construction costs (Berthelemy et al., 
2016). Furthermore, the lower construction time lowers the pre-completion risk (Rosner 
and Goldberg, 2011). With respect to SMRs, Kuznetsov and Lokhov (2011) showed that, 
for example, if the construction duration for a small plant is three years instead of six years 
for a large plant, the savings due to lower interest during construction will be 9% at a 5% 
discount rate and 20% at a 10% discount rate (Figure 20), assuming a flat spending profile. 
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Current target schedules for SMRs are typically three years for the FOAK with a 
subsequent reduction to two years for the NOAK (Carelli et al., 2007a). 
 
Figure 20 – Cost of financing as a function of construction duration and discount 
rate (Kuznetsov and Lokhov, 2011) 
3.2.5 Capital outlay and capital at risk factor 
Because of their lower design power, the total capital investment cost of an SMR 
is only a fraction of the cost of a large plant, with a subsequent lower front-end investment 
required. This aspect could be a critical factor especially for those countries or utilities with 
limited financing resources (Ramana and Ahmad, 2016). Another benefit of the smaller 
power of SMRs compared to large reactors is the lower market risk for the utility, as they 
produce less power that needs to be sold as compared to GWe-level plants, and are 
therefore less likely to depress prices in their own market. Furthermore, the combination 
of the reduced front-end investment and the shorter construction time makes it possible to 
minimize the capital at risk through a staggered construction/operation of multiple modules 
deployed in succession, as illustrated in Figure 21, where the maximum amount of capital 
at risk for a large reactor is about 65% higher than that for four SMRs of the same total 
power (Petrovic et al., 2012). 
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Figure 21 – Staggered modular build reduces maximum cash outlay and capital at 
risk (Petrovic et al., 2012) 
3.3 Project risks estimates and unknown unknowns 
In identifying contingencies, a proper project probabilistic cost and schedule risk 
model has to be developed. However, not all risks can be identified in advance. As Donald 
Rumsfeld, US Secretary of State for Defense, stated in February 2002, “There are known 
knowns. There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to 
say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown 
unknowns. There are things we do not know we don't know” (Rumsfeld, 2002). 
Following this consideration, risks can be classified based on the level of 
knowledge about a risk event's occurrence (either known or unknown) and the level of 
knowledge about its impact (either known or unknown). This leads to four categories of 
risk (Cleden, 2009; Raydugin, 2010): 
1. Known–knowns (knowledge); 
2. Unknown–knowns (impact is unknown, but existence is known, i.e., untapped 
knowledge); 
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3. Known–unknowns (risks); 
4. Unknown–unknowns (unfathomable uncertainty); 
5. Biases (conscious or subconscious systematic errors occurring when identifying 
and quantifying general uncertainties and uncertain events. 
In the nuclear industry, an example of known unknowns is the duration of an 
activity, which behaves as a stochastic process, whose value cannot be known with 
certainty. Unknown unknowns occur whenever information about uncertainties exists but 
is not accessible, or simply does not exist. In this case, the impact of these uncertainties 
cannot be evaluated in advance (Stoelsnesa, 2007). The reasons why some risks cannot be 
detected in advance are various (Hillson, 2005):  
1. Risks are inherently unknowable; 
2. Some risks are time-dependent; 
3. Some risks are progress-dependent; 
4. Some risks are response-dependent, i.e., secondary risks. 
In the nuclear industry, an example of an unpredictable event having unpredictable 
consequences are the TMI accident that took place in March 1979, and or the 9/11 
terroristic attack in New York City, which caused unpredictable changes in regulations by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In the US, all plants completed after 1979 
began construction before the TMI event, and all experienced a cost escalation, as 
described in Section 2.3 (Figure 5). Following the 9/11 attack, NRC introduced new design 
requirements after the plant design had been completed, which led to redesign the shield 
buildings to be airplane crash proven. Westinghouse Electric Company had to revise the 
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AP1000 project with subsequent delays in the construction with a subsequent cost increase 
(Hals and Flitter, 2017). Several publications point to the importance of taking unknown 
unknowns into account in risk management (Chapman and Ward, 2003; Hubbard, 2009; 
Wideman, 1992). Missing or inadequately taken into account unknown unknowns lead to 
non-adequate contingencies. 
There are different ways of managing unknown unknowns 
(projectmanager.com.au, 2016). A quantitative approach consists of analyzing historical 
data and trends as well as the established project parameters, costs and, limitations. A 
qualitative approach consists of estimating potential project restraints and failures through 
project management experience. Unknown unknowns can be converted to known 
unknowns, based on expert assessment/judgement, and different cases can be run through 
risk assessment tools. However, the very reason the unknowns are unknown to us in the 
first place is that they are hard to establish based on the past track records and predictable 
challenges. Also, the study of the type of industry may provide useful insights when 
evaluating unknown unknowns (Raydugin, 2010). The downside of this approach is 
potential for the managers to err in their estimations and assessments. 
3.3.1 The four aspects of unknown unknowns 
Raydugin (2010), identifies four aspects of unknown unknowns. First, unknown 
unknowns are higher for a unique and novel project. The development of a new technology, 
or the development in a new geography, increase the overall project risk exposure, 
including unknown unknowns. Second, the amount of standardization and repetitiveness 
adopted by an organization affects the occurrence of unknown unknowns. The organization 
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experience, lesson learned and similarity with an already adopted technology can reduce 
unknown unknowns. The third aspect is related to the phase of a project development. A 
project at an earlier phase of development is inherently characterized by more unknown 
unknowns. The type of industry or projects inside a particular industry (for example, 
natural gas vs. nuclear vs. coal) can provide useful insights when assessing project 
unknown unknowns. The fourth relates to the level of bias of the project. As Raydugin 
(2010) points out, organizations tend to be “optimistic” in evaluating risks and consciously 
exclude some “factors such as hidden agendas, when some risks might be missed on 
purpose, to make a project more attractive, etc. This may be based on explainable desire to 
get project funding or support from key stakeholders” (Raydugin, 2010). There is no doubt 
that during construction of the four AP1000 units in the US (two in Vogtle and two in VC 
Summer), project managers have underestimated the impact of unknown unknowns. In 
these projects, omissions of unknown unknowns belonging to the categories described in 
this section can be found. The AP1000 design, despite being based on standard PWR 
technology, can be considered a new technology. The new design of the nuclear island 
structures, new nuclear components (reactor pressure vessel pumps, modules), new 
construction technique make the reactor a new technology. Modular construction of the 
NPPs had never been adopted before in the nuclear industry. Therefore, despite the 
intended higher standardization of components, the construction itself can be considered a 
novel approach, making the reactors 1st-of-a-kind plants. Moreover, project managers 
might have been too “optimistic” in evaluating the construction capabilities of WEC and 
the manufacturing capabilities of nuclear components by CB&Is Stone and Webster 
(earlier acquired by Shaw Group). The mistakes made in the concrete pouring at Vogtle, 
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or the mistakes made by Shaw in the manufacturing of the RPV head might support this 
argument. 
3.3.2 Incorporating unknown unknowns in a risk management tool 
Unknown unknowns can be estimated analyzing the risk occurrence on previous 
projects, analyzing historical data. Based on the project managers experience, the risk 
evaluation can be modified to also include a qualitative risk assessment. Successively, 
unknown unknown allowances can be introduced in the probabilistic risk assessment 
models. Duration allowances can be introduced as an activity at the very end of the project 
schedule, which can be expressed as a percentage of the construction duration. 
Alternatively, an additional risk can be associated with the project completion milestone, 
assigning a probability to this risk. Considering a probability less than 100% reflects the 
possibility that some unknown unknowns are associated with activities outside the critical 
path and, therefore, have minimal or no impact on the project duration (Raydugin, 2010). 
The effect of the TMI event on the construction of the nuclear reactors completed 
after 1979 was analyzed as a representative example of unknown unknown.  
3.3.3 Uncertainties and cost contingency 
AACE International (2016) defines contingency as "An amount added to an 
estimate to allow for items, conditions, or events for which the state, occurrence, or effect 
is uncertain and that experience shows will likely result, in aggregate, in additional costs”. 
Cost contingency is typically estimated using statistical analysis or judgment based on past 
asset or project experience. In a project, the cost contingency is intended to provide 
compensation for “estimating accuracy based on quantities assumed or measured, 
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unanticipated market conditions, scheduling delays and acceleration issues, lack of bidding 
competition, subcontractor defaults, and interfacing omissions between various work 
categories.” (American Society of Professional Estimators, 2004). The cost contingency is 
calculated through a probabilistic analysis of the TCIC distribution, as: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = 𝑝'DED − 𝑀𝑜'DED  (25) 
Where Cont is the cost contingency, pTCIC is the desired percentile rank of the 
distribution, and MoTCIC is the mode of the TCIC distribution. Often used percentile ranks 
are the 75th or the 90th. In the nuclear industry, the 75th percentile is mostly used (Talabi, 
2017). In this case, the cost contingency is:  
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = 𝑝'DED − 𝑀𝑜'DED  (26) 
Where the 75th percentile rank corresponds to the third quartile of the distribution 
(Q3).  
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4 COST ESTIMATE METHODS 
The cost estimating process of a new generation reactor can take two different 
paths: top-down or bottom-up, depending on the stage of the project and the resources 
available to the design team. 
Bottom-up cost estimating consists of collecting very detailed data on components 
and activities involved in the NPP construction, such as equipment, materials and labor 
quantities. Labor-hour rates, installation rates, commodities and unit prices are then applied 
to calculate costs of activities and components. This approach relies on the manufacturing 
assembly plan, the PBS and the WBS, that have to be available at the estimating stage. 
For projects early in the development process, Bottom-up cost estimates are often 
not practical to use, as information on manufacturing and installation techniques of these 
systems is not available. For these projects, top-down cost estimating techniques are 
preferable. The first step consists of identifying a reference design to which estimating 
techniques can be applied. The estimating part consists of scaling up or down the costs of 
systems and components used in similar projects. 
4.1 EVAL 
EVAL is a methodology that was developed to calculate TCIC of an NPP. A 
schematic of the EVAL process is shown in Figure 22. The methodology was implemented 
in MS Project 2010 through the use of a series of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) 
scripts. VBA scripts were made to automatically import data from inputs, contained in MS 
Excel spreadsheets, and automatically extract and calculate outputs into MS Excel 
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spreadsheets. The methodology relies on a bottom-up approach that is based on the 
availability of a Part Breakdown Structure (PBS) or Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) of 
the NPP. Both the PBS and WBS contain information on components, activities and 
construction logic. The PBS is a list of components that make the NPP, where the 
construction logic and the activities are expressed as a function of the parts. The WBS is a 
list of the activities (work) needed for the NPP completion (AACE International, 2016), 
each associated with the parts needed for the activity and the logic with other activities. 
The construction process of an NPP can be either described by a PBS or a WBS, depending 
on the specific choice of the nuclear vendor under consideration. From the PBS or WBS, 
the construction schedule of the NPP is generated, associating attributes (activities and 
components construction times and costs) to every component and activity. An as-late-as-
possible (ALAP) logic is used, as it allows a delayed (just-in-time) cash flow that lowers 
the value of TCIC. However, delaying activities in order to make activities end-dates 
coincide with start-date of subsequent activities, increases the project possible delays and 
project risk. The analysis shown in this paper was conducted to evaluate the impact of key 
parameters assuming a deterministic construction schedule and deterministic inputs (costs 
and durations). Duration of activities, cost of equipment, cost of materials, labor rates were 
provided by the vendor, but typical labor rates and material unit costs are publicly available 
in literature (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007). Ongoing work is addressing the 
probabilistic aspect of the schedule and cost; it will allow assessing the risk associated with 
ALAP. Duration of activities, cost of equipment, cost of materials, labor rates were 
provided by the vendor, but typical labor rates and material unit costs are publicly available 
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in literature (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007). TCIC is calculated integrating 
the cash flow taking into account the time value of capital. 
 
Figure 22 – EVAL process 
In summary, the methodology implemented in MS Excel and MS Project consists 
of the following steps: 
1. Create PBS/WBS (parts needed from factory, activities, construction logic) 
in MS Excel (input 1); 
2. Create MS Excel file (input 2) with supply chain data (fabrication 
construction times/costs, labor rates, activities durations/costs); 
3. Import data through VBA script from inputs 1-2 to MS Project file to model 
construction process; 
4. Calculate and export to MS Excel output file through VBA scripts the 
following: direct costs; indirect costs; IDC; TCIC; cash flow profile; project 
duration. 
As EVAL is based on a bottom-up methodology, it can be used for a NPP of any 
size and reactor as long as very detailed data on the design was developed. A baseline 
design, with number of components, and layout diagrams for all major systems, commodity 
quantity estimates, labor rates, activity durations, unit material costs, have to be available. 
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As a consequence, EVAL can be applied only to reactors at a mature design stage and 
cannot be applied to reactors at a pre-conceptual or conceptual stage of development. 
Construction of a modular NPP proceeds in three different stages: fabrication, 
assembly and installation. In the fabrication stage, components (modules) are 
manufactured according to shippable constraints. The transportation constraints are defined 
by standard rail shippable limits, which are 12x12x80 feet (approximately 3.7x3.7x24.4 
meters) for a weight of 80 tons. The fabrication of a module is preceded by a construction 
time, which represents the time between ordering and fabrication. At the time of ordering, 
the cash flow associated with the equipment is assumed to take place. The cash flow 
associated with the labor and material required to the manufacturing process is distributed 
over the process duration. After the fabrication stage, modules are transported to the site. 
Schematic of the sequence between fabrication activities and cash flow is shown in Figure 
23. 
 
Figure 23 – Module fabrication cash flow representation 
The WEC-SMR relies on a more compact site layout than that of the PWR12. As 
the NI performs the function of the PWR12 containment building, fuel storage building, 
administration and service building, and part of the radioactive waste (radwaste) building. 
In the PWR12-BE cost accounts, the components that are included in the WEC-SMR NI 
represent the 49.7% of the plant direct cost. The WEC NI is shown in Figure 24. The 
 56 
nuclear island of the WEC-SMR is made of different modules that can be categorized by 
the function they perform: 
• Mechanical (safety) 
• Mechanical (non-safety) 
• Instrumentation and control (I&C) • Composite 
• Structural 
In EVAL, modules were categorized by module type, and typical fabrication costs 
and durations were used for each module type. On site, modules are assembled into super 
modules in the on-site assembly area. Super modules are designed according to the capacity 
of the crane available on site, as they need to be lifted and installed in the on-site hole to 
form the nuclear island (installation stage). Fabrication costs and construction times, and 
activities durations and costs were provided by the nuclear vendor. Cost of activities in the 
assembly and installation stages are distributed over the activities durations. The 
construction model of the WEC-SMR nuclear island is made of 1953 activities in the 
fabrication, assembly and installation stages. Testing follows the installation stage, and the 
cost was neglected. A breakdown of number of activities in each stage is shown in Table 
10. EVAL was used to describe the construction of the WEC-SMR nuclear island, but it 
can be applied to a NPP of any size and design. However, since the methodology relies on 
a bottom-up approach, the nuclear reactor under consideration has to be at a late stage of 
development, as fairly detailed data (PBS/WBS, supply chain data), needs to be available. 
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Table 10 – WEC-SMR nuclear island, number of activities 
 Number of 
activities 






Figure 24 – WEC-SMR nuclear island (Bowser) 
 




4.1.1 Modularization and TCIC 
The benefits of modularization were calculated comparing three different strategies 
in the construction of the WEC-SMR nuclear island. The three construction strategies are 
shown in Fig. 9 and each one is characterized by a different degree of modularization. 
 
Figure 26 – Construction strategies schematic 
The first construction strategy is defined as the complete modularization, as 
modules are fabricated in factory, assembled into super modules in the on-site assembly 
area and installed in the hole to create the nuclear island. The second construction strategy 
is characterized by a lesser degree of modularization as modules are fabricated in the on-
site assembly area where they are assembled into super modules. The third construction 
strategy represents stick-built construction: modules are fabricated in factory, shipped to 
the site and installed in the hole, where the connections between modules are performed. 
Structural modules are not part of the stick-built construction, as the structures are built in 
the hole. No super modules are present in this construction strategy. The construction 
strategies were chosen to evaluate the impact of each construction location on TCIC. The 
comparison between strategy one and strategy two highlights the effect of off-site modular 
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fabrication. The comparison between strategy one and strategy three shows the impact of 
the on-site modules assembly stage. It is important to note that NOAK cost inputs for 
modules and components were used. Under this assumption, the investment required to 
design and develop a supply chain for the SMR under consideration was not considered. 
As described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, modular construction carries high investment costs 
in the supply chain that may increase the total risk of SMR deployment. The scope of this 
analysis is to quantify and estimate the benefits of modular construction on Total Capital 
Investment Cost of a NOAK single unit NPP, as compared to standard stick-built 
construction. 
As the construction process of the WEC-SMR nuclear island is described in terms 
of the PBS, EVAL inputs for the first construction strategy are derived from the WEC-
SMR part breakdown structure. Attributes of activities and components are taken from the 
industry experience in NPP construction. The assumption that no limitation is present in 
the offsite factories production capabilities was made. Factories were assumed to be 
capable of producing the exact number of modules needed on site at any time, i.e. there is 
no constraint on the degree of parallelism allowed in the fabrication stage. Inputs for 
strategy two are the same as those of strategy one. As fabrication is performed in the on-
site assembly area, the level of parallelism allowed in this stage is lower and, therefore, the 
number of activities that can take place at the same time is lower In fact, as the availability 
of space in the assembly area is lower than in the factory, the assembly area is more 
congested,. The third construction strategy represents stick-built construction. The logic of 
connecting components in the third construction strategy is different than that of 
construction strategy one and two, as the installation stage is made of different activities. 
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Mechanical, I&C and structural modules are manufactured in factory and transported on 
site where they are installed level by level in the hole, as the construction of structures 
proceeds. The equipment needed for modules connections, which is part of composite 
modules in strategy one and two, is shipped to site and used to perform connections in the 
hole. Durations of installation activities were based on industry experience and on the use 
of the 1-3-8 rule. 
4.1.2 TCIC sensitivities 
Calculating TCIC of a NPP is fundamental to determine the economic 
competitiveness of its particular design. TCIC estimate is dependent on particular 
assumptions and cost models adopted. Sensitivity analyses on TCIC and direct costs 
obtained can show the impact of the assumptions. Furthermore, changing attribute values 
of key components and activities through sensitivity analyses can be used to improve the 
construction process and better inform the stakeholders decisions. Effect of the discount 
rate on TCIC was evaluated.   
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5 MODELING UNCERTAINTIES: METHODS AND APPROACH 
In this chapter, the methods used to combine and describe uncertainties in the 
construction of an NPP are presented. As the construction of an NPP is dependent on 
different variables, uncertainties were combined through the use of a Monte Carlo method. 
Commodity and equipment costs, and activity durations were modeled through triangular 
distributions and sampled through the Monte Carlo method in order to estimate 
distributions of project durations, OCC and TCIC and calculate cost contingency.  
5.1 The effect of uncertainties 
Whenever an activity is by its nature stochastic, its expected present value of cost 
is invariably greater than its present value if the activity is assumed to be deterministic. 
The demonstration compares an activity modeled as deterministic and an activity assumed 
to have a symmetric triangular distribution. The triangular distribution is a continuous 
probability distribution function described by three parameters: the most probable value 
(c), a lower limit (a) and an upper limit (b). In project management, durations and costs of 
activities are often described by a triangular distribution, as it allows to describe the 
stochastic nature of costs and durations through these three parameters. In fact, sufficient 
actual data to describe the probabilistic nature of costs and durations is typically not 
available. The triangular distributions facilitate the use of expert judgement to perform 
stochastic analysis, as it allows project managers to provide only the most probable, the 
minimum and maximum values instead of providing mean values and standard deviation 
(as it happens if a normal distribution is used). Moreover, distributions of activities and 
costs are often asymmetric, which reduces the number of probability distributions that can 
 62 
be used. The probability density function of an activity with a triangular distribution is 
shown in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27 – Symmetric triangular probability density function 
This probability density function is described functionally as 
 
 (27) 
The cash flow of an activity of duration dA, start time TA,s and end time TA,e is 
presented in Figure 28. We assume that the cost of the activity (CA) is accrued in the middle 
of its duration (dA/2). This is a simplification, as in reality the cash flow follows a particular 
distribution over time. Eq. 28 is used to calculate the present value of cost of the activity 
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Figure 28 – Activity cash flow representation  
Eq. 28 represents the present value of cost of an activity with a deterministic 
duration, under the assumption that the cost of the activity is accrued in the middle of its 
duration. The average expected present value of cost of the activity, assuming that the time 
at which cost accrued can be described using probability density function and calculated 
using Eq. 29: 
 
 (29) 
In case duration is expressed using a probability density function, the integral can 
be adjusted through a change of variables, as indicated in Eq. 30: 
  (30) 
and the integral becomes: 
 
 (31) 
In case we consider a symmetric triangular distribution, we can express the upper 
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It can also be shown that for a symmetric triangular distribution, the most probable 
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Eq. 35 states the expected value of the cost CA is composed of the present value of 
cost of the deterministic activity multiplied by a term representing the probabilistic effects 
on the activity duration: 
 
 (36) 
Eq. 37 presents the ratio between the expected value of cost of the triangular 
symmetrically distributed activity and the present value of cost of the deterministic activity: 
 
 (37) 
It can be shown that the ratio expressed in Eq. 37 is always greater than one, 
indicating that the expected value of the cost CA (if d is a random variable with symmetric 
triangular distribution) is always greater than the present value of the cost CA when d is 
deterministic. Eq. 37 as a function of s is plotted for different values of the discount rate r 






























Figure 29 – Expected cost value as a function of the distribution dispersion for 
different discount rate values (c = 200 days) 
 
Figure 30 – Expected cost value as a function of the distribution dispersion for 
different activity durations (r = 15%) 
Whenever a stochastic effect is introduced in the duration of a manufacturing 
process, the present value of cost of this process is always higher than the case when the 
process is deterministic (with duration equal to the average duration of the stochastic case). 
We also note that as s increases, the present value of cost increases and the differences 
between the average value and the lower and upper bounds increase. These facts support 
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the need for an extensive study of the impact of randomness on the SMR construction 
process. 
5.2 The Monte Carlo method 
The Monte Carlo method is used to evaluate the dispersion in the output of a system 
given a probability distributed input through statistical sampling. The entire system is 
simulated a large number of times where, in each simulation, each random variable 
assumes a value according to its probability distribution. The value of each random variable 
is sampled through a random number generator. The output of a single Monte Carlo 
simulation consists of a single value that depends on the values taken from all the random 
variables in the simulation. Outputs from different simulations are separate and 
independent, each representing a possible “state” of the system. Results from independent 
system realizations are then assembled to study the dispersion of the results. Considering 
a random variable x that takes values according to a specific probability distribution, its 
probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) are defined 
as f(x) and F(x), respectively. In every simulation, the value of the cumulative distribution 
function is sampled trough a random number generator. The random number generator 
generates random numbers ξ uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The value that F(x) 
takes in the simulation is then: 
 𝐹(𝑥) = 𝜉 (38) 
To sample the value of the random variable x, the inversion has to be performed: 
 𝑥 = 𝐹(𝜉)A@ (39) 
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Sampling the variable x through this procedure for a number of times we obtain an 
estimate of its distribution. The inversion of the cumulative distribution function of x can 
be performed through different techniques. TCIC is calculated summing all the project 
costs that are stochastically sampled. Repeating this procedure for a large number of runs, 
we calculate the average value and variance of TCIC in the Monte Carlo simulation through 
















In the analysis shown in this paper, variances are labeled as s.The Monte Carlo 
method was used to estimate the uncertainties in project duration, OCC, TCIC and estimate 
contingency for a general SMR design and for PWR12-BE. 
5.3 Symmetric probability distributions 
5.3.1 Symmetric triangular distribution sampling 
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𝑏 − 𝑎 < 𝜉 < 𝑏
 (42) 
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Equating the cumulative distribution function to ξ, where 0 < ξ < 1, yields the 
inverse cumulative distribution function (Eq. 43): 
 
𝑥| = 𝐹(𝜉)A@ = }
𝑎 + ~(𝑏 − 𝑎)(𝑐 − 𝑎)𝜉
𝑏 − ~(𝑏 − 𝑎)(𝑏 − 𝑐)(1 − 𝜉)





𝑏 − 𝑎 < 𝜉 < 𝑏
 (43) 
Using a random number (between 0 and 1) generator, we can use Eq. 43 to compute 
the value of each random variable in every run. Example of random variables in the 
construction process are activity durations and costs of components. The lower and upper 
limits were expressed as a percentage of the most probable value c, through the parameter 
s. The most probable values of the distributions were chosen as the deterministic value of 
the random variable. For example, if the random variable expresses the cost of probability 
of a component, the most probable of the distribution (parameter c) was chosen as the 
deterministic value of the component cost. 
 𝑎 = 𝑐(1 − 𝑠) (44) 
 𝑏 = 𝑐(1 + 𝑠) (45) 
The parameter s is a dispersion indicator of the probability distribution. The 
triangular distribution variance is equal to its second moments given in Eq. 46: 
 𝜎R = 𝜇R =
1
18(𝑎
R + 𝑏R + 𝑐R − 𝑎𝑏 − 𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐) (46) 
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5.3.2 Normal distribution sampling 
Eq. 48 and 49 present the probability density function and the cumulative density 







R%  (48) 
 𝐹(𝑥) =
1




A random number ξ is generated and Eq. 49 is inverted to calculate the value of the 
random variable x. Every random variable is described by a mean value (equal to the 
deterministic value of the random variable) and a standard deviation. The standard 
deviation was expressed as a fraction of the mean value, as: 
 𝜎 = 𝑡	 ∙ 𝜇 (50) 
A normal distribution can be approximated by a symmetric triangular distribution, 
if the two distributions have the same mean value and standard deviation. Equating the 
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value of the parameter t (Eq. 47) to the value of s (Eq. 50), since c and µ both represent the 
deterministic cost and duration of the activity, the relationship between t and s is: 







The values of t used in the simulations are shown in Table 11. 







5.4 Asymmetric probability distributions 
Activity durations and costs are naturally described by asymmetric distributions; 
the probability that an activity will take longer (with a higher cost) than expected is more 
likely than the activity will take less time (with lower cost) than expected. Such situations 
are well represented by positive asymmetric distributions (skewed to the right).  
5.4.1 Asymmetric Triangular distribution sampling 
In the case where the triangular distribution is skewed to the right, the distance 
between c and b is higher than the distance between a and b (Figure 31). 
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Figure 31 – Asymmetric triangular probability density function 






A value of w equal to 1 represents the case where the two sides of the triangle have 
the same length and the distribution reduces to a symmetric triangular distribution. The 
minimum value of the distribution a is expressed as a fraction of the most probable value 
c, while the maximum value of the distribution b is expressed through w: 
 𝑎 = 𝑐 ∙ (1 − 𝑠) (53) 
 𝑏 = 𝑐 ∙ (1 + 𝑤 ∙ 𝑠) (54) 
Each type of activity is characterized by different values of s and w (distribution 
skew). The parameter s represents the width of the distribution in case the probability 
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distribution is symmetric. In other words, in case the probability distribution is skewed to 
the right, s represents the width of the left side of the distribution. Both parameters s and w 
may depend on various factors, as: 
- Activity type; 
- Activity location (factory, assembly area, hole); 
- Site location (in which country the NPP is built); 
- Learning, as the nth plant of its kind is characterized by sharper distributions with 
activity durations and costs closer to the most probable value (deterministic value). 
However, for simplification, in each simulation, every activity was assumed have 
the same values of s and w. When a project is simulated using a Monte Carlo simulation, 
every activity cost and duration are calculated through the generation of random numbers 
𝜉. The triangular cumulative distribution function expressed by Eq. 42 is then inverted (Eq. 
43) and the activities duration and cost are calculated. The value of TCIC for the project is 
then calculated based on the project schedule and cash flow. DC is then calculated 
summing the costs of all activities. For the SMR, OCC is calculated through Eq. 7, and for 
the PWR12-BE OCC is calculated through Eq. 24. For both plants, IDC is calculated 
through Eq. 20, and TCIC is calculated summing OCC and IDC (Eq.  21). In summary, the 
process is based on the following steps: 
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1. Sample random number 𝜉; 
2. Calculate activity costs and durations, as: 
 
𝑥 = 𝐹(𝜉)A@ = }
𝑎 + ~(𝑏 − 𝑎)(𝑐 − 𝑎)𝜉
𝑏 − ~(𝑏 − 𝑎)(𝑏 − 𝑐)(1 − 𝜉)





𝑏 − 𝑎 < 𝜉 < 𝑏
 (55) 
3. Calculate DC as the sum of all activity costs; 
4. Calculate OCC as (see Eqs. 22-24): 
 𝑂𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 ∙ (1 + 0.35) (56) 
 𝑂𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 ∙ (1 + 0.67) ∙ (1 + 0.078) (57) 
5.5 Correlated sampling through the Iman-Conover method 
In the construction of a NPP, cost of components and duration of activities are not 
independent, but inter-correlated. For example, the cost of different components might 
depend on the price of the same commodities, such as steel and labor. Therefore, the 
correlation between variables was modeled. The method adopted here to account for partial 
correlations between input variables was originally developed in 1982 by Iman and 
Conover (1982), and then implemented in financial software such as “@Risk”. The method 
was also used by Ganda et al. (2015) to sample correlated capital costs of different NPP 
designs. Iman and Conover developed the method while studying how radionuclides might 
escape a waste depository in bedded salt. While working on these models, they realized 
that the assumption of independence between input variables was not appropriate. For 
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example, significant correlations were expected to exist between hydraulic properties in 
the vicinity of the disposal site and the time required for the circulating ground water to 
contact radioactive wastes. Similarly, subsets of variables in the construction of a NPP are 
expected to show a significant degree of correlation. For example, costs of different 
components are dependent on the price of the same commodities, or delays in construction 
durations are correlated for activities of the same type (e.g. welding, concrete pouring).  
Methods of sampling correlated normal distributed variables were well known at 
the time of the Iman and Conover work. In the case of normal distributions, a linear 
combination of independent random variables produces a multivariate normal input vector. 
Not so, however, for non-normal random variables. In their paper, Iman and Conover 
(1982) proposed a “distribution independent” method which preserves the original 
marginal distributions. The method, which is based on rank correlations, is presented here. 
Assume a vector X of uncorrelated random variables. As the elements of X are uncorrelated, 
the correlation matrix of X will be the identity matrix I. C is the desired correlation matrix 
of a transformation of X. If the correlation matrix is calculated from a set of data, each item 







Where 𝑐𝑜𝑣e𝑥, 𝑥h represents the covariance between the elements xi and xj of X. 
As a correlation matrix, C is positive definite and symmetric and can be written as: C = 
PP’, where P is a lower triangular matrix. On this basis, the linear transformation XP’ of X 
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has the desired correlation matrix C. A “score” matrix is introduced, as the simple 
multiplication of by to obtain a matrix with the proper correlation coefficients also would 
alter the values of the sampled distributions. The objective is for the rank correlation matrix 
M of the input vector to be as close as possible to the correlation matrix C, given as input, 
after the transformation by P. In this method, certain important properties of the input 
vector, such as marginal distributions, are preserved. Keeping the same notation as Iman 
and Conover (1982), let K be the number of variables (for example, the different correlated 
NPP equipment costs) and N be the sample size (number of simulations). Let Rl be the NxK 
matrix generated by the independent permutations of N integer numbers, generated by 
sampling from a uniform distribution. Then, it needs to be checked that the correlation 
matrix of Rl is “close to” I, to ensure that to the sampled vector is uncorrelated. Afterwards 
the rank matrix R is generated through the Van der Waerden scores as: 
 𝑅 = √2 erfA@ 2 ∙
𝑅
𝑁 + 1 − 1 
(59) 
Subsequently, a rank matrix R* having the correlation coefficients very close to the 
target value of C is generated by performing the transformation: 
 𝑅∗ = 𝑅𝑃′ (60) 
Afterwards, uncorrelated costs vectors can be sampled independently from the 
corresponding marginal distributions, generating the matrix k. Finally, the values in each 
column of the sampled matrix k are rearranged so that they will have the same ordering as 
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the corresponding column of R*, generating the final matrix K, in which the sampled values 
of k have the same ordering of R*. 
This method was used to sample variables in the construction of a general SMR 
design and of PWR12-BE, in order to estimate the uncertainties in project duration, OCC, 
TCIC and evaluate the cost contingency for the two projects. Activities were modeled with 
triangular distributions, and activity durations were sampled assuming certain values of the 
correlation matrix components. Activities were grouped in different groups, depending on 
the location where they are performed (factory, on-site assembly area, on-site hole). 
Activities in the same group were modeled with the same correlation coefficient, while 
activities in different groups with another correlation coefficient.  
5.6 Modeling the price of commodities and equipment 
An example of known-unknown variable in the construction of a NPP is the price 
of commodities and equipment, which is not constant with time, and depends on the state 
of the market. The US Department of labor keeps a record of historical commodities and 
price of components. Labor cost is recorded through the Employment Cost Index (ECI). 
The index representing the total compensation for private industry workers in all industries 
and occupations was used (US Department of Labor, 2017b). In the PWR12-BE cost data, 
different cost types were identified. The percentage of each cost type is shown in Table 12. 
Price of commodities (concrete and steel) was taken from the Producer Price Index (PPI) 
commodity data (US Department of Labor, 2017c). Price of industrial components was 
taken from the PPI industry data (US Department of Labor, 2017c). The commodity and 
equipment costs were modeled with the following variables: 
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1. Labor (x1) 
2. Concrete (x2) 
3. Steel (x3) 
4. Fabricated structural metal bar joists and concrete reinforcing bars (x4) 
5. Sheet metal work manufacturing (x5) 
6. HVAC and commercial refrigeration equipment (x6) 
7. Metal tanks and vessels, custom fabricated and field erected (x7) 
8. Metal tank, heavy gauge, manufacturing (x8) 
9. Steel product manufacturing from purchased steel (x9) 
10. Pump and compressor manufacturing (x10) 
11. Power boiler and heat exchanger manufacturing (x11) 
12. Iron and steel pipes and tubes, purchased iron and steel (x12) 
13. Metal valve manufacturing (x13) 
14. Turbine and power transmission equipment manufacturing (x14) 
15. Fabricated heat exchangers and steam condensers (except for nuclear 
applications) (x15) 
16. Electrical equipment manufacturing (x16) 
17. Mechanical power transmission equipment manufacturing (x17) 
18. Elevators and moving stairways (x18) 
The 18 variables consist of one labor variable (x1), two commodities variables (x2 
and x3), and 15 equipment variables (x4 through x18). Historical prices in the period 2007-
2017 were used. The price values were corrected for inflation, and they are shown in 
Appendix A, along with the CPI values over time (US Department of Labor, 2017a). Each 
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variable was modeled with triangular distributions using minimum, maximum and mode 
historical monthly recorded values (escalated to 2017 USD) in the period 2007-2017. 
Values of the index were normalized by their mode, calculated for a histogram with five 
bins. The PPI distributions were then fitted to triangular distributions, taking the minimum 
value of the normalized index as a and maximum value of the normalized index as b. The 
value of the index for labor and steel are shown in Figure 32 and Figure 33, along with 
their respective histograms and fitted triangular distributions. However, no historical data 
of nuclear equipment was available. For this purpose, the PWR12-BE breakdown of 
equipment costs was also used as a cost breakdown of the SMR components.  
The correlation between variables was calculated using Eq. 58. The correlation 
matrix is represented in Figure 34, and the values of the correlation coefficients are reported 
in Appendix A. Figure 36 shows the absolute value of the correlation matrix in grayscale. 
The correlation between variables describes how the market values of the commodities and 
components are correlated. Sampling each variable accounting for the correlation is 
equivalent to sample the “state” of the market, which drives the prices of commodities and 
components. The state of the market is then sampled through a Monte Carlo simulation, 
accounting for the correlation between variables (x1,…,x18). At the end of each simulation, 
the total direct cost was calculated as the sum of all components, labor and materials. 
Through this process, the construction schedule is neglected and, therefore, TCIC is not 
calculated. As a high number of Monte Carlo simulations are performed, a OCC 
distribution is obtained, and its standard deviation can be calculated. This approach was 
applied to both the SMR and the PWR12-BE. 
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Fabricated structural metal bar joists and 
concrete reinforcing bars 
0.46% 
Sheet metal work manufacturing 1.23% 
HVAC and commercial refrigeration equipment 0.57% 
Metal tanks and vessels, custom fabricated and 
field erected 
0.83% 
Metal tank, heavy gauge, manufacturing 5.53% 
Steel product manufacturing from purchased 
steel 
4.41% 
Pump and compressor manufacturing 3.23% 
Power boiler and heat exchanger manufacturing 3.81% 
Iron and steel pipes and tubes, purchased iron 
and steel 
3.08% 
Metal valve manufacturing 0.00% 
Turbine and power transmission equipment 
manufacturing 
14.12% 
Fabricated heat exchangers and steam 
condensers (except for nuclear applications) 
3.63% 
Electrical equipment manufacturing 3.35% 
Mechanical power transmission equipment 
manufacturing 
5.03% 
Elevators and moving stairways 0.05% 
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Figure 32 – Normalized PPI labor over time and frequency 
 




Figure 34 – Representation of the market prices correlation matrix 
 





5.7 Modifying the model parameters to fit the historical data 
Once the SMR and PWR12-BE distributions of project durations, OCC and TCIC 
were obtained, their mean and standard deviation values were compared to the ones 
calculated from the historical data. In order to increase the output dispersion and obtain 
comparable results to the observed data in terms of OCC and project duration, the inputs 
of the model were then modified. With this goal, two approaches were identified: 
1. Increase the correlation coefficients between commodities and equipment prices, 
and the correlation between activities of the same stage; 
2. Increase the dispersion of the price and activity duration probability distributions. 
Both approaches were explored, for pre-1979 data (case a) and post-1979 data (case 
b). Therefore, four sets of simulations were performed (Table 13). 
Table 13 – Sets of simulations to fit the historical NPP cost and time data 
 b. POST-1979 
a. PRE-1979 1. Increase ⍴	2. Increase broadness 
 In the first approach, the correlation coefficients were simply increased to represent 
a market where all prices are more correlate while, in the second case, the prices dispersions 
were increased by broadening the triangular distributions. The distance between the 
minimum value and most probable value, and the distance between the maximum value 
and the most probable was increased. The values of the parameters a and b was calculated 
multiplying the values (c-a) and (b-a) by a coefficient d2 (Eq. 43 and Eq. 44). 
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 𝑎 = 𝑐 − (𝑐 − 𝑎) ∙ 𝑑R (61) 
 𝑏 = 𝑐 + (𝑐 − 𝑏) ∙ 𝑑R (62) 
In the first approach, the following steps were followed (case 1a): 
1. Increase d1 until the relative standard deviation of the project duration was in the 
range 19.15% - 19.24%; 
2. Increase d2 until the relative standard deviation of the OCC was in the range 36.45% 
- 36.54%. 
 
In the second approach, the following steps were followed (case 2a): 
1. Manually set the correlation coefficient between activities of the same type to 0.99; 
2. Increase d1 until the relative standard deviation of the project duration was in the 
range 19.15% - 19.24%; 
3. Set the correlation coefficient between activities of the same type to 0.99; 
4. Increase d2 until the relative standard deviation of the OCC was in the range 36.45% 
- 36.54%. 
To simulate the cost escalation, the price modes (c) were increased using the 
parameter i1, while to simulate the increase in project duration, the duration modes were 
increased through the use of the parameter i2, as shown in (Eqs. 63,64): 
 𝑐`g,q% = 𝑖@ ∙ 𝑐`g,g (63) 
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 𝑐 ¡,q% = 𝑖R ∙ 𝑐 ¡,g (64) 
To account for the cost and time increases after the TMI event, the first approach 
was modified as follow (case 1b): 
1. Increase d1 until the relative standard deviation of the project duration was in the 
range 22.75% - 22.84%; 
2. Increase the value of i1, until the project duration mean was increased of a factor in 
the range 1.75-1.84;  
3. Increase d2 until the relative standard deviation of the OCC was in the range 42.45% 
- 42.54%; 
4. Increase the value of i2, until the project duration mean was increased of a factor in 
the range 2.65-12.74. 
The second approach was modified as follow (case 2b): 
1. Set the correlation coefficient between activities of the same type to 0.99; 
2. Increase d1 until the relative standard deviation of the project duration was in the 
range 22.75% - 22.84%; 
3. Increase the value of i1, until the project duration mean was increased of a factor in 
the range 1.75-1.84;  
4. Set the correlation coefficient between prices to 0.99; 
5. Increase d2 until the relative standard deviation of the OCC was in the range 42.45% 
- 42.54%; 
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6. Increase the value of i2, until the project duration mean was increased of a factor in 
the range 2.65-12.74. 
The two approaches previously presented differ as either the distribution 
dispersions (approach 1) or correlation coefficients (approach 2) are increased. However, 
the observed data can be described through a hybrid method (approach 3), where increasing 
both the distribution dispersions and the correlation coefficients. In regard to the activity 
durations, it is reasonable to assume that activities are highly correlated, but not close to 
1.0. A case with almost 1.0 correlation implies that all activities are highly dependent on 
each other, and an event occurring in a single activity would most certainly (with a 
probability approaching 1) have an effect on all other activities. Therefore, the correlation 
coefficients for activity durations were not modified from the base case (⍴1 = 0.75, ⍴2 = 0). 
Regarding the commodity and equipment prices, the correlation coefficients was set half-
way between 0 and 0.99, that is 0.50. Approach 3a consists of the following steps: 
1. Set the correlation coefficient between activities of the same type to 0.99; 
2. Increase d1 until the relative standard deviation of the project duration was in the 
range 19.15% - 19.24%; 
3. Set the correlation coefficient between prices to 0.50; 
4. Increase d2 until the relative standard deviation of the OCC was in the range 36.45% 
- 36.54%. 
Approach 3b consists of the following steps: 
1. Increase d1 until the relative standard deviation of the project duration is in the 
range 22.75% - 22.84%; 
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2. Increase the value of i1, until the project duration mean is increased of a factor in 
the range 1.75-1.84;  
3. Set the correlation coefficient between activities of the same type to 0.50; 
4. Increase d2 until the relative standard deviation of the OCC was in the range 42.45% 
- 42.54%; 
5. Increase the value of i2, until the project duration mean was increased of a factor in 




6 DETERMINISTIC RESULTS 
EVAL produced construction schedules for the three construction strategies of the 
WEC-SMR (Maronati et al., 2016a; Maronati et al., 2016b). Project durations for the three 
construction strategies are shown in Table 14. Through strategy two, modules are 
fabricated in the assembly area, which allows a lower number of activities that can be 
performed in parallel as compared to an off-site factory. Under the assumptions that were 
made, the parallelism in the assembly area is such that the critical path of strategy one and 
two is the same, and only activities that are not on the critical path are affected. These 
activities need to start earlier in order to preserve the critical path, with a cash flow profile 
that takes place earlier in time. However, in strategy one modules need to be transported to 
the site, as they are fabricated in off-site locations. As a consequence, project duration 
according to construction strategy one is slightly longer than that of strategy two, as the 
critical path includes transportation of modules from off-site factories to site. 
Table 14 – Project durations for the three construction strategies 
 Duration 
Strategy 1 1701 days 
Strategy 2 1642 days 
Strategy 3 2315 days 
The absolute cash flows (not discounted) of direct costs for each strategy are 
presented in Figure 36. Base costs were calculating summing cash flows according to Eq. 
1 and TCIC was calculated through Eq. 12. TCIC and cash flows were normalized to the 
TCIC of the third construction strategy, as it represents the reference methodology in NPP 
construction. The cash flow profile for strategy is shifted earlier in time as compared to 
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that of strategy one, as the assembly area is more congested and fabrication activities have 
to start earlier. The difference in TCIC is mainly due to the different cash flow profile, 
which is delayed in time for strategy one. As cash flows occur later, the time value of 
money and the interest accrued during construction are lower, with lower value of TCIC. 
The cash flow of stick-built construction (strategy three) is more complex. As the assembly 
stage is not part of this construction methodology, the structures and the equipment 
required to connect modules are needed later in time in the installation stage. As a 
consequence, the cash flow peak representing the installation stage is delayed in time. 
However, as the installation stage is longer, mechanical and I&C modules have to be 
available earlier in time and the fabrication stage has to start earlier. This explains the first 
peak in the cash flow profile according to construction strategy three. 
 
Figure 36 – Cash flow for the three construction strategies 
TCICs breakdown into Base Costs and OCCs are presented in Table 4, calculated 
with a 5% (Table 15) and a 10% discount rate (Table 16) respectively. In this analysis, each 
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value of TCIC is normalized to the TCIC of strategy three. Reduction in each cost item in 
respect to strategy three is shown in parentheses. Absolute values of base costs and OCCs 
are the same for the two cases, as they not dependent on the discount rate. Complete 
modularization of the nuclear island (represented by strategy one) allows a 36.74% savings 
in base costs. Once owner’s costs are added to calculate OCC, savings decrease to 29.82%. 
OCC savings adopting strategy one and two are lower than the respective BC savings, as 
owner’s cost are slightly dependent on the value of BC (Eq. 3). As owner’s costs are added 
to calculate OCC, their weight on BC is higher for strategies with lower BC value (strategy 
one and two). As a consequence, the relative increase of OCC from BC due to the value of 
owner’s costs is higher as BC is lower, and the OCC savings are lower. IDC values depend 
on the amount of OCC and the cash flow profile. As the cash flow profile is delayed in 
time, IDC is lower as the value of the cash flow at the end of the project (when revenue 
begins) is lower. Strategy three has a longer project duration than strategy one and two, 
and the cash flow profile has two peaks. The first peak occurs before projects according to 
strategies one and two begin, while the second peak is delayed in time with respect to the 
peak of the other two construction strategies. IDC due to the second peak of the strategy 
three cash flow profile is lower than IDC due to the peaks of strategies one and two. 
However, for strategy three IDC accrued to the cash flow that constitute the first peak cause 
the value of IDC to increase. These two opposite phenomena cause TCIC savings for 
strategy one and two to not considerably differ from OCC savings. For strategy one, 
calculated with a 10% discount rate, TCIC savings are slightly higher than OCC savings 
(in respect to strategy three) due to the lower OCC absolute value and the absence of the 
first cash flow peak. For strategy two calculated with a 10% discount rate, TCIC savings 
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are slightly lower due to the higher IDC value calculated from the cash flow that occur 
earlier in time than the second peak of strategy three. Considering a 5% discount rate, TCIC 
savings are slightly lower than OCC savings for both strategies one and two. In fact, as a 
lower discount rate is considered, IDC value becomes less predominant for strategies 
having lower absolute values of OCCs. 
Table 15 – TCIC breakdown for the three construction strategies (5% discount rate) 
 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
BC 0.50 (-36.74%) 0.70 (-10.61%) 0.78 
OCC 0.68 (-29.82) 0.89 (-8.61%) 0.97 
TCIC 0.71 (-29.46) 0.92 (-8.20%) 1.00 
Table 16 – TCIC breakdown for the three construction strategies (10% discount 
rate) 
 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
BC 0.44 (-36.74%) 0.63 (-10.61%) 0.70 
OCC 0.61 (-29.82) 0.79 (-8.61%) 0.87 
TCIC 0.70 (-29.95) 0.91 (-8.26%) 1.00 
From the TCIC values shown it is possible to calculate the TCIC difference between 
construction strategy one and two, which shows the impact of off-site modular fabrication. 
Considering a 10% real discount rate, adopting construction strategy one instead of strategy 
two, TCIC is 23.64% lower. The TCIC difference between construction strategy two and 
three shows the impact of the adoption of the on-site assembly area. This difference is equal 
to 8.26%. As the reactor is fully modularized, TCIC is 29.95% lower than if it is built 
adopting stick-built construction. This analysis was conducted considering that the cost of 
the nuclear island is the only contributor to TCIC. However, a NPP also includes 
components and structures outside the nuclear island, which may or may not be constructed 
through modularization. However, considering a proportionality between direct cost and 
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TCIC, under the assumption that components outside the nuclear island do not allow 
modularization, and that the nuclear island makes up 50% of direct cost, the savings on 
TCIC are about 15%. Through this type of analysis, EVAL can be used to identify the most 
cost effective construction strategy of a NPP, given the reactor design. 
6.1 Sensitivity analyses 
The impact of different factors on the results presented in the previous section was 
evaluated through sensitivity analysis (Maronati et al., 2015; Maronati et al., 2016a; 
Maronati et al., 2016b). 
6.1.1 Discount rate 
Values of TCIC as a function of the discount rate were calculated and are plotted 
in Figure 37. As previously, TCICs were normalized to the value of TCIC of strategy three. 
TCICs increase with the discount rate for each construction strategy, as the cost of 
financing (interest during construction) increases with the discount rate (Eq. 9). TCIC 
savings adopting full of partial modularization (strategy one and two) slightly increase with 
the discount rate (Figure 38). 
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Figure 37 – TCIC as a function of the discount rate 
 
Figure 38 – TCIC savings as a function of the discount rate 
6.1.2 1-3-8 rule 
In standard modularization, the size of the modules is constrained to the capacity 
of rail-shippable limits. However, in case this constraint is relaxed, a higher degree of 
modularization is achievable. For instance, if the transportation by barge is available, the 
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size of the modules could be increased so that the assembly stage is eliminated, and the 
super modules are fabricated in the factory. Then, instead of shipping by rail or road about 
600 modules comprising a representative SMR nuclear island, up to 10 super modules 
would need to be shipped by barge. Moreover, if the NI is built through factory-made super 
modules, the total weight of the equipment that needs to be transported to the site is the 
same, or likely lower, as the number of composite modules is reduced, as shown in Section 
III. Furthermore, transportation by barge is more efficient than transportation by rail and, 
therefore, is likely cheaper. Alabama River Improvement Association (2017)Alabama 
River Improvement Association (2017)Alabama River Improvement Association 
(2017)Alabama River Improvement Association ( shows that, for every gallon of fuel 
burned to move 1 ton, barge can reach a relative distance of 514 miles, almost nine times 
more than truck (59 miles), and over two and one half times more than rail (202 miles). 
This section summarizes the findings presented in Maronati and Petrovic (2018). 
The same construction schedule of the WEC-SMR was used in this analysis, but the 
absolute values of costs were modified to represent a generic “reference” Small Modular 
Reactor having a NI direct cost of $500 M. The savings due to the assembly of the super 
modules in an off-site factory, as compared to the assembly in the on-site assembly area, 
was evaluated. As the assembly activities are moved to the factory, the activities are 
shortened, and the amount of labor needed for the super modules assembly is lower, 
resulting in a lower value of TCIC. The labor reduction was calculated assuming the 
validity of the 1-3-8 rule. Under this assumption, the amount of assembly labor is reduced 
to 1/3. All assembly activities are shortened by a factor 3, and the new construction 
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schedule is calculated, calculating the new project duration. The SMR cost breakdown of 
the base case is shown in Table 17. 
Table 17 – SMR nuclear island cost breakdown (reference case: 10% assembly 
labor) 
 Cost (USD) 
Cost  
percentage 
NI installation labor 50,000,000 10.00% 
SM assembly labor 50,000,000 10.00% 
Big components 50,000,000 10.00% 
Big components installation 10,000,000 2.00% 
Small components 10,000,000 2.00% 
Modules equipment cost 330,000,000 66.00% 
NI direct cost 500,000,000 100.00% 
Base cost  550,000,000  
OCC 775,000,000  
TCIC 918,277,683  
A sensitivity analysis was performed on the amount of assembly labor. For this 
purpose, the amount of all costs was left unchanged, while the assembly labor was changed 
to represent 5%, 15%, and 20% of the total nuclear island cost. For these cases, the same 
construction schedule of the reference case was used, and only the assembly stage labor 
was changed. The total nuclear island cost was increased accordingly. The cost breakdown 
for the different assembly labor percentages is shown in Table 18, Table 19 and Table 20. 
Table 20. A sensitivity analysis was conducted on the 3-to-1 factor of the 1-3-8 rule, 
evaluating labor-hours reduction factor in the range 2-4. The resulting rules are here 
referred to as 1-2-8 and 1-4-8 rule. For these cases, the durations of assembly stage 
activities were changed. From the reference case having super modules assembled on site, 
the assembly activities durations were reduced by a factor of 2 and 4, respectively. 
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Table 18 – SMR nuclear island cost breakdown (5% assembly labor) 
 Cost (USD) 
Cost 
percentage 
NI installation labor 50,000,000 10.56% 
SM assembly labor 23,684,211 5.00% 
Big components 50,000,000 10.56% 
Big components installation 10,000,000 2.11% 
Small components 10,000,000 2.11% 
Modules equipment cost 330,000,000 69.67% 
NI direct cost 473,684,211 100.00% 
Base cost  521,052,631  
OCC 744,736,842  
TCIC 882,419,641  
 
Table 19 – SMR nuclear island cost breakdown (15% assembly labor) 
 Cost (USD) 
Cost 
percentage 
NI installation labor 50,000,000 9.44% 
SM assembly labor 79,411,765 15.00% 
Big components 50,000,000 9.44% 
Big components installation 10,000,000 1.89% 
Small components 10,000,000 1.89% 
Modules equipment cost 330,000,000 62.33% 
NI direct cost 529,411,765 100.00% 
Base cost  578,766,246  
OCC 805,236,834  






Table 20 – SMR nuclear island cost breakdown (20% assembly labor) 
 Cost (USD) 
Cost 
percentage 
NI installation labor 50,000,000 8.89% 
SM assembly labor 112,500,000 20.00% 
Big components 50,000,000 8.89% 
Big components installation 10,000,000 1.78% 
Small components 10,000,000 1.78% 
Modules equipment cost 330,000,000 58.67% 
NI direct cost 562,500,000 100.00% 
Base cost  611,854,481  
OCC 839,979,481  
TCIC $995,270,208  
 
This analysis was conducted considering that the same modules (in number and 
type) need to be fabricated, despite the assembly takes place in the assembly area or in the 
factory. However, as the super modules are fabricated in factory, the design of modules do 
not need to be optimized under the transportation constraint (Table 17). Modules can be 
designed so that a lesser number of connections need to be performed on the assembly 
stage. The savings due to the lower number of support connections, pipe connections, and 
cable connections was calculated. In all cases, the transportation cost of equipment 
(modules or super modules, depending on the construction strategy) from the factory to the 
site was not included. This is assumption is conservative, as barge transportation is more 
efficient than rail transportation. Therefore, building the nuclear island from barge 
transported super modules will be cheaper than building the nuclear island from rail 
transportable modules. 
As before, the results are normalized to the base case TCIC. As super modules are 
fabricated in an off-site factory and the 1-3-8 rule is applied, TCIC is 94.16% of TCIC in 
case the super modules are assembled in the on-site assembly area, which corresponds to a 
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5.84% decrease in TCIC. If the additional transportation cost required for the super 
modules is lower than the TCIC saving, this construction methodology provides an overall 
cost benefit. 
A sensitivity analysis was performed on both the fraction of assembly labor cost 
and on the 1-3-8 rule. The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39 – 1-3-8 rule sensitivity analysis 
If the 1-3-8 rule is valid, TCIC is reduced by 3-10%, i.e., it is in the range 90-97% 
of TCIC of the reference case. If the savings in moving the assembly stage to the factory 
is lower, and the 1-2-8 rule is used, TCIC is reduced less and is in the range 0.92-0.98. If, 
instead, the 1-4-8 rule is used, TCIC is reduced more and is in the range 0.88-0.96. 
Since the super modules are fabricated in the factory, a lesser number of 
connections need to be performed in the assembly stage and the number of composite 
modules can be reduced. In this analysis, it was assumed that the number of composite 
modules is reduced by half. Therefore, both the equipment cost and the assembly labor cost 


















reference case (where 1-3-8 rule applies), TCIC is further reduced by roughly 4% (Table 
21), depending on the amount of assembly labor used. A sensitivity analysis was performed 
on the fraction of reduction of composite modules. The number of composite modules was 
also reduced by factors 3 and 4, and TCIC was calculated. In the most optimistic case in 
which the number of composite modules is reduced by a factor of 4, TCIC falls in the range 
0.84-0.90 (Figure 40). 







Figure 40 – Composite modules reduction sensitivity analysis 
The most optimistic case is represented by a construction that allows a reduction in 
the number of composite modules by a factor of 4, in which the 1-4-8 rule is valid (Figure 
41). For this case, considering an NI whose direct cost is made by 20% of assembly labor, 
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7 MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS RESULTS 
In this chapter, the results of the Monte Carlo simulations are described. For a 
Generic SMR, Section 7.1 reports the results of the simulation performed assuming 
uncorrelated variables, while Section 7.2 reports the results of the simulations where 
variables are assumed correlated. Section 7.3 describes the results obtained for PWR12-
BE. In Section 7.4, the inputs of the PWR12-BE construction model were modified to fit 
the pre-1979 and post-1979 historical data. The updated inputs were then applied to the 
SMR case. All Monte Carlo simulations performed in this work are made of 105 runs. 
Million dollars are denoted as M-$, while billion dollars were denoted as B-$. 
7.1 Uncorrelated variables 
The first set of analyses assumes uncorrelated variables. For WEC-SMR, every cost 
item (equipment, material, labor) is treated as a random variable and is described through 
a probability distribution. As in Section 4.1.2, for this analysis cost values of the WEC-
SMR were modified to represent a general reference SMR with an NI direct cost of $500 
M, assuming that the labor cost of the assembly stage constitutes 10% of the NI direct cost. 
In any case, the absolute cost is arbitrary and does not negatively influence the results, as 
this study focuses on the uncertainties relative to the absolute value. The costs of this plant 
were artificially generated to represent two 300 MWe twin-units, for a total power level of 
the plant of 600 MWe. However, the analysis was extended to include non-NI components 
and buildings. As presented in Section 2.2, for the PWR12-BE, the components that are 
included in the WEC-SMR NI make up the 49.7% of the direct cost. In this analysis, it was 
assumed that the NI constitutes 50% of the cost of the plant. This assumption implies that 
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the non-NI components and buildings have the same level of modularization as the nuclear 
island. The breakdown of the NI cost was presented in Table 17, while the cost breakdown 
of whole SMR plant is shown in Table 22. In the IDC calculation, a 10% cost of capital 
was assumed. 
Table 22 – SMR cost breakdown 
 Cost (USD) 
NI direct cost 500,000,000 
Non-NI direct cost 500,000,000 
Direct cost 1,000,000,000 
Base cost  1,100,000,000 
OCC 1,350,000,000 
TCIC 1,620,354,167 
The cost of an activity is dependent on the duration of the activity. As the activity 
takes longer to be completed, the amount of total labor is higher. However, some delays do 
not lead to a higher amount of labor. For example, activities that are delayed due to the 
detection of a design problem are stopped until the issue is solved at the design level, and 
it does not increase the direct labor. The cost of an activity also depends on the cost of 
material, which is likely not to vary with the activity duration. Despite this might be true 
for the majority of cases, there are cases where a delay might cause a greater quantity of 
material to be used. Certain mistakes in tasks involving a high use of materials can be 
effectively fixed only by repeating part of or the whole activity, resulting in a higher use 
of the material. For this case, a fraction of each activity, representing the labor cost, was 
assumed directly dependent on the duration of the activity. A simplified construction 
model, consisting of 80 modules, was used. The fabrication stage consists of 80 activities, 
each one representing the fabrication of each module. It was assumed that the modules of 
the same type are fabricated in series, while modules of different types can be fabricated 
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in parallel. The assembly stage and the installation stage of the simplified model consist 
respectively of 8 activities and 12 activities, for a total number of 100 activities for the 
whole construction model. The construction schedule of the I&C and mechanical modules 
is shown in Figure 42 and Figure 43, while the activities of the assembly and installation 
stages is shown in Figure 44. It was assumed that the activities of the fabrication, assembly, 
and installation of the non-NI components and buildings are never critical and take place 
in parallel with the construction of the NI. 
 





Figure 43 – SMR construction schedule (fabrication of mechanical modules) 
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Figure 44 – SMR construction schedule (assembly and installation stage) 
In each simulation, the duration and cost of every activity were described by a 
triangular distribution, with deterministic duration and cost as most probable values, and 
the resulting TCIC is calculated, using a cost of capital of 10%. The mean value and the 
TCIC standard deviation the simulations were also calculated, and the TCIC histogram is 
shown. For both triangular distributed and normally distributed activities, the TCIC 
dispersion increases with the standard deviation (relative to the mean) of the distributions 
(s and t for triangular and normal distribution respectively). Also, the TCIC mean value 
increases as a consequence of the time value of money. 
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7.1.1 Symmetric Distributions 
7.1.1.1 Triangular Distributions 
Monte Carlo simulations were performed varying the values of s. For simplicity, 
the value of s was fixed for all activities in the same simulation. This assumption is not 
realistic, as different types of activities are characterized by different relative standard 
deviations. However, the analysis so conducted is useful in order to understand the 
dispersion in TCIC as a function of the dispersion activities costs and durations. Figure 45, 
Figure 46 and Figure 47 show the project duration, OCC and TCIC distributions as a 
function of s. Cost contingency is calculated from the TCIC distribution as the difference 
between the TCIC 75th percentile and the TCIC mode, , as explained in Section 3.3.3. The 
results, including cost contingency, are presented in Table 23, Table 24 and Table 25, and 
show an increase in the relative standard deviations with s. 
 
Figure 45 – Project duration distribution for s = 0.50, s = 1.00, s = 2.00 
Table 23 – Project duration (symmetric triangular distributions) 
s µdur (years) σdur/µdur 
0 4.0 - 
0.50 4.4 5.4% 
1.00 4.8 9.9% 
2.00 5.6 16.7% 
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Figure 46 – OCC distribution for s = 0.50, s = 1.00, s = 2.00 
Table 24 – OCC and OCC relative standard deviation (symmetric triangular 
distributions) 
s µOCC σOCC/µOCC 
0   
0.50 1.36 B 2.0% 
1.00 1.35 B 4.1% 
2.00 1.36 B 8.2% 
 
Figure 47 – TCIC distribution for s = 0.50, s = 1.00, s = 2.00 
Table 25 – TCIC and TCIC standard deviation (symmetric triangular distributions) 
s µTCIC σTCIC/µTCIC Mode TCIC75% Contingency 
0 1.62 B -   - 
0.50 1.65 B 2.6% 1.64 B 1.67 B   37.75 M 
1.00 1.67 B 5.1% 1.66 B 1.73 B   66.00 M 




7.1.1.2 Normal distribution 
As for symmetric triangular distributed activities, in every simulation all activities 
were assumed to have the same fractional standard deviation (expressed as a linear function 
of the mean value). The ratio between the standard deviation and the mean value is 
expressed by the parameter t (Eq. 50). The values of t were chosen to correspond to the 
values used for the symmetric triangular distribution and were calculated from the s values 
through Eq. 51. The resulting distributions are shown in Figure 48, Figure 49 and Figure 
50, and the results are presented in Table 26, Table 27 and Table 28. Relative standard 
deviations increase consistently with t, as well as with the mean TCIC value. 
 
(a)     (b)    (c) 
Figure 48 – Project duration distribution for t = 0.20 (a), t = 0.41 (b), t = 0.82 (c) 
(normal distributions) 
Table 26 – Project duration (symmetric triangular distributions) 
t µdur 
(years) σdur/µdur 
 4.0 - 
0.20 4.4 5.6% 
0.41 4.7 10.2% 




(a)     (b)    (c) 
Figure 49 – OCC distribution for t = 0.20 (a), t = 0.41 (b), t = 0.82 (c) 
Table 27 – OCC and OCC relative standard deviation (normal distributions) 
t µOCC σOCC/µOCC 
 1.36 B - 
0.20 1.35 B 2.0% 
0.41 1.36 B 4.1% 
0.82 1.35 B 8.2% 
 
(a)     (b)    (c) 
Figure 50 – TCIC distribution for t = 0.20 (a), t = 0.41 (b), t = 0.82 (c) 
Table 28 – TCIC and TCIC standard deviation (normal distributions) 
t µTCIC σTCIC/µTCIC Mode TCIC75% Contingency 
 1.62 B -  - - 
0.20 1.64 B 2.6% 1.65 B 1.67 B 21.8 M 
0.41 1.67 B 5.12% 1.68 B 1.73 B 44.6 M 
0.82 1.73 B 10.17% 1.72 B 1.84 B 121.0 B 
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7.1.1.3 Summary 
TCIC mean values and standard deviations calculated from Monte Carlo 
simulations for triangular and normal distributed activities duration and cost are 
summarized in Table 29. The results show an accordance between the use of triangular and 
normal distributions. In the use of symmetric probability distributions, the differences in 
TCIC mean values and standard deviations obtained through triangular and normal 
distributions are very small, showing the equivalence between the two distributions in 
describing activities durations and costs. 
Table 29 – TCIC and TCIC standard deviation (symmetric triangular and normal 
distributions) 
  Triangular Normal 
s t µTCIC σTCIC/µTCIC µTCIC σTCIC/µTCIC 
0  1.62 B - 1.62 B - 
0.50 0.2041 1.65 B 2.6% 1.64 B 2.6% 
1.00 0.4082 1.67 B 5.1% 1.67 B 5.12% 
2.00 0.8165 1.73 B 10.1% 1.73 B 10.17% 
In fact, despite the use of quite dispersed probability distributions (0 < σ/µ < 0.82), 
the numerical results indicate only a weak dependence of uncertainties in the construction 
process on TCIC. For the maximum value of s considered (where b and a are +/-200% of 
c), TCIC has a relatively low standard deviation (9% of TCIC). Figure 51 and Figure 52 






Figure 51 – TCIC as a function of the dispersion of normal distributed activities 
 
Figure 52 –TCIC standard deviation as a function of the dispersion of normal 
distributed activities 
Comparing the results to the observed data, the TCIC relative standard deviation 
obtained through this analysis looks underestimated. This raises two possible concerns: 
- The use of symmetric distributions to describe activities is not representative of the 
real SMR nuclear island construction. In reality, activities have a higher probability to 
be completed later rather than earlier. This concern was addressed through the use of 






















- Activity duration and cost values cannot be treated as uncorrelated random variables. 
This concerned will be addressed through considering correlations between random 
variables. 
7.1.2 Asymmetric triangular distributions 
Asymmetric triangular distributions were described through the parameters s and w 
introduced in Section 5.4. Monte Carlo simulations were performed for different values of 
s and w to show the impact of these values on TCIC. For simplification, in every simulation 
the same value of s and w was used for all activities, computing the value of a and b of the 
distribution based on the most probable (deterministic) value, through Eq. 53 and Eq. 54. 
The same values of s that were considered for the symmetric case were used, and values of 
w between 1 and 10 were used. Numerical results of these simulations are shown in Table 
30. TCIC mean and standard deviation as a function of w for fixed values of s are shown 
in Figure 53 and Figure 54, according to the data points shown in Table 30. 
Table 30 – TCIC and TCIC standard deviation (asymmetric triangular 
distributions) 
 w=1 w=2 w=5 
s µTCIC σTCIC/µTCIC µTCIC σTCIC/µTCIC µTCIC σTCIC/µTCIC 
0.50 1.65 B 2.6% 2.35 B 4.4% 3.15 B 5.8 % 
1.00 1.67 B 5.1% 3.19 B 7.4% 5.04 B 9.0% 
2.00 1.73 B 10.1% 5.16 B 11.4% 9.91 B 12.9 % 
Figure 53 shows that TCIC suffers a significant increase with the asymmetry of the 
triangular distribution. The TCIC standard deviation as a percentage of TCIC mean value 
is shown in Figure 54. The simulations indicate that the TCIC standard deviation increases 
with the level of asymmetry, reaching 30% of the mean value for w equal to 10. 
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Figure 53 – TCIC as a function of the level of asymmetry (triangular distribution, 
s=0.50) 
 
Figure 54 – TCIC standard deviation as a function of the level of asymmetry 
(triangular distribution, s=0.50) 
7.1.3 Introducing more realistic distributions 
More realistic probability distribution functions were introduced (Van-Wyk, 2016). 
All activities were described through triangular distributions, and the same triangular 
distribution parameters were used for activities in each construction location (factory, on-
site assembly area, on-site hole). Minimum, maximum, and most probable durations of 
each type of activity are shown in Table 31. Activities of the same stage were modeled 

























Table 31 – Activity durations minimum and maximum values (triangular 
distribution) 
 Minimum Maximum 
Modules fabrication -10% +30% 
Super modules assembly -10% +80% 
Concrete pouring -5% +200% 
NI installation -10% +80% 
Under these assumptions, Monte Carlo simulations are performed and project 
duration, OCC and TCIC distributions are obtained. The project duration and OCC 
distributions are shown in Figure 55, while the results are summarized in Table 32. The 
project duration distribution has a mean value of 5.0 years with a relative standard deviation 
of 4.1%. The highest project duration is 6.0 years, 50% higher than the deterministic project 
duration. The OCC mean value is $1.51 B and a relative standard deviation of 1.86%. It is 
important to note that, because of the activity durations asymmetry (skewed to the right), 
the average sampled OCC value is higher than the deterministic value of $1.35 B (11.8% 
higher). 
 
Figure 55 – Project duration and OCC distributions 
Once the interest during construction is added to OCC, the TCIC distribution shown 
in Figure 56 is obtained. The average TCIC value is $1.87 B, with a relative standard 
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deviation of 1.4%. The cost contingency is 28.77M, which corresponds to 1.5% of the 
TCIC mean value. The maximum TCIC value obtained in the simulation is $1.99 B, 6.4% 
higher than the mean value. 
 
Figure 56 – TCIC distribution (r=10%) 
Table 32 – TCIC distribution results, considering of activity durations uncertainties 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 5.0 1.51 B 1.87 B 
σ/µ 4.1% 1.26% 1.86% 
Mode 5.0 1.51 B 1.88 B 
75%   1.90 B 
Contingency   28.77 M 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  1.5% 
Despite the use of different probability distributions for different activities and the 
use of asymmetric probability distributions, the TCIC and OCC relative standard 
deviations are still underestimated, the OCC one being about 29 times lower than the one 
measured from the observed trend of NPP construction before 1979. The reason for this 
lies in the fact that all variables that were sampled in the previous simulations were 
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assumed to be uncorrelated. As they are uncorrelated, their variations largely cancel out 
and the combined relative uncertainty is reduced. Moreover, the higher is the number of 
random variables used, the lower is the combined relative standard deviation. For this 
reason, a method to include correlations between variables and sample correlated random 
variables was developed. As correlations are introduced, correlated variables tend to take 
similar values in the same simulation and, subsequently, results for individual samples are 
more dispersed. 
7.2 Correlated variables 
7.2.1 Correlated activities 
Activity durations were described through triangular distributions, and activities 
taking place in the same stage were correlated with a higher correlation coefficient than 
activities taking place in different stages. These assumptions reflect the scenario where 
each construction stage shares a certain number of resources (equipment, material, special 
workers, management). As delays in a certain stage take place due to the “failure” of a 
resource, it is most likely that all activities using the resource will be affected. For example, 
as all the off-site fabricated equipment is provided by one manufacturer, in case design 
issues are identified in the fabrication process, all components fabricated by the 
manufacturer will be affected. This assumption reflects the scenario that took place in the 
construction of the AP-1000 units in the U.S., in Vogtle and VC Summer. For both projects, 
Shaw Group was responsible for the fabrication of all reactors modules and, as delays occur 
in the fabrication, the fabrication of all modules was delayed. Activity durations of the 
same stage were correlated with a correlation factor ρ1 equal to 0.75. Activities of different 
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stages were correlated with a correlation factor ρ2 equal to 0. The values of these 
coefficients were chosen to represent a case where the activities taking place under the 
same environmental conditions are “somewhat” positively correlated, while activities 
taking place in different stages are not correlated. As an example, it can be intuitively seen 
that components fabricated in the same factory, or with the same manufacturing 
technologies, or that were designed by the same manufacturer, are exposed to the same 
causes of delays. If a design defect, or a manufacturing problem are found in the production 
line, it is most likely that most of the components fabricated under the same conditions will 
be affected. The effect of these coefficient values on TCIC is later analyzed through 
sensitivity analysis. Under these assumptions, Monte Carlo simulations were performed 
and project duration, OCC and TCIC distributions were obtained. The project duration and 
OCC distributions are shown in Figure 57. The project duration has a mean of 4.9 years, 
with a mode of 4.7 years and a relative standard deviation of 7.8%. The highest project 
duration is 6.4 years, 36.1% higher than the mode.  The OCC distribution has a mean of 
$1.51 B and a relative standard deviation of 5.9%. As the probability distributions of 
activity durations are asymmetric (skewed to the right), the OCC distribution is also 
asymmetric, with an average sampled OCC value that is higher than the deterministic value 
of $1.35 B (11.8% higher). 
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(a)       (b) 
Figure 57 – Project duration (a) and OCC (c) distributions 
The TCIC distribution is shown in Figure 58. The average TCIC value is $1.87 B 
and the TCIC relative standard deviation is 7.0%, about 3.8 times higher than the one 
obtained in the uncorrelated case. The mode of the distribution is $1.85 B, and the 
maximum TCIC value obtained in the simulation is $2.36 B, 27.5 % higher than the mode. 
The results of the simulation are summarized in Table 33. 
 
 119 
Figure 58 – TCIC distribution (r=10%) 




OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 4.9 1.51 B 1.87 B 
σ/µ 7.8% 5.9% 7.0% 
Mode 4.7 1.54 B 1.85 B 
75%   1.96 B 
Contingency   106.0 M 
7.2.1.1 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis on the correlation coefficients was performed. For r2 equal 
to zero, simulations were performed with r1 in the range from 0 to 0.99. TCIC histogram 
plots for r1 = 0, 0.25 and 0.99 are shown in Figure 59. The results of the sensitivity analysis 
on r1 are shown in Table 34. The TCIC standard deviation and the project contingency 
increase with the value of r1, which indicates an increase in both the TCIC dispersion and 
TCIC skewness with the correlation coefficient. 
The project duration slightly decreases with the correlation coefficient. Despite this 
fact might seem counterintuitive, it is explainable by carefully analyzing the construction 
critical path. In a simulation, for parallel activities in the critical path having same duration, 
the overall project duration is determined by the sampled longest activity. For small 
correlation coefficients, the parallel durations are very slightly correlated, which implicates 
that their duration is independent one from the other. Then, the project duration of each 
simulation will always be high, as it is necessary that even only one activity is above the 
mode that the project duration will be above the mode. In this case, there is a high chance 
that the simulation will result in a project duration above the deterministic value. In case 
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the activities are highly correlated, in the same simulation all activities will take either long 
durations (which determines a high project duration) or short durations (which determines 
a short project duration, shorter than the most probable value). Therefore, some simulations 
will result in a project duration shorter than the deterministic value and, combining all 
results, the average project duration will be shorter than if the activities are uncorrelated. 
 
(a)                                        (b)                                    (c) 
Figure 59 – TCIC distribution (r=10%, r2=0); a) r1=0; b) r1=0.50; c) r1=0.99; 













0 5.0 1.51 B 1.87 B 1.86% 1.88 B 1.90 B 28.8 B 
0.25 4.9 1.51 B 1.88 B 4.32% 1.88 B 1.93 B 51.1 M 
0.50 4.9 1.51 B 1.88 B 5.8% 1.86 B 1.95 B 84.7 M 
0.75 4.9 1.51 B 1.87 B 7.0% 1.85 B 1.96 B 106.0 M 
0.99 4.8 1.51 B 1.87 B 8.0% 1.82 B 1.97 B 141.2 M 
A sensitivity analysis on the correlation coefficient between activities of different 
stages was performed, considering values of r2 in the range between 0 and 0.99. The 
correlation coefficient r1 was set equal to 0.99 and not 0.75 (nominal case). This is because 
the case if r2 is higher than r1, the correlation matrix of durations is non-positive semi 
definite, which is against the conditions that make the Iman-Conover method valid. Even 
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intuitively, it is not realistic to have a case where the correlation coefficient between two 
activities of different stages is higher than the correlation coefficient of two activities of 
the same stage. For example, if both activities af1 and af2 in the fabrication stage have r12 
= 0.99 with activity aa1 in the assembly stage, then both af1 and af2 must be correlated with 
a coefficient (at least) higher than 0.99.  
TCIC histogram plots are shown in Figure 60 and the results of the simulations are 
summarized in Table 35. As in the r1 sensitivity analysis, both TCIC standard deviation 
and project contingency increase with the correlation coefficient. In the worst case 
(complete correlations between activities in same and different stages), the contingency is 
$415.8 M, about 14 times higher than the completely uncorrelated case (r1 = 0, r2 = 0, 
Table 32). 
 
(a)                                        (b)                                    (c) 

















0 4.8 1.51 B 1.87 B 8.0% 1.82 B 1.97 B 141.2 M 
0.25 4.8 1.51 B 1.87 B 9.6% 1.79 B 1.99 B 189.6 M 
0.50 4.8 1.51 B 1.87 B 11.0% 1.76 B 2.00 B 242.9 M 
0.75 4.8 1.51 B 1.87 B 12.2% 1.70 B 2.02 B 329.4 M 
0.99 4.8 1.51 B 1.87 B 13.4% 1.62 B 2.04 B 415.8 M 
 
7.2.2 Market uncertainty 
The study was further developed analyzing the cost of components and 
commodities. Each equipment and commodity cost was obtained multiplying the sampled 
normalized commodity or commodity cost (with most probable value of 1) by the 
respective deterministic cost given as input. Simulations were run for values of the 
correlation coefficients equal to zero, equal to the one calculated based on historical data, 
and equal to one. Figure 61 and Figure 63 show some example of correlated samples 
between different commodity costs. Labor and steel costs are negatively correlated, with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.6997, and to high values of one variable correspond low values 
of the other, and vice versa. The cost of steel and “iron and steel pipes and tubes” are very 
correlated, as their correlation coefficient is 0.9024. Labor and electrical equipment cost 




Figure 61 – Example of sampling correlated commodity prices 
 
Figure 62 – Example of sampling three correlated commodity prices  
Once the commodity costs were sampled, the total direct cost was calculated as the 
sum of all components, labor and materials. Results of the Monte Carlo simulation are 
shown in Table 36. Results show that the OCC relative standard deviation increases with 
the correlation coefficient. The direct cost histogram plot is shown in Figure 63. For a value 
of the correlation coefficients equal to the one calculated from the trend in commodity 
prices (ρij = ρreal) the OCC mean is $1.40 B, and its relative standard deviation is 3.9%. The 
OCC mean is constant with the correlation factor (Table 36). The relative standard 
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deviation of OCC is 3.4% for the case where all commodity and equipment prices are 
completely uncorrelated, and it is 5.5% for the case ρij = 0.99 (Table 36). The relative 
standard deviation of the case where ρij = ρreal is only 0.5% higher than the uncorrelated 
case, which suggests that most commodity and equipment are uncorrelated. 
 
Figure 63 – Direct cost distribution, based on market uncertainty (ρ = ρreal) 
Table 36 – OCC uncertainty based on market uncertainty 
 µOCC ($) σOCC/µOCC 
ρ = 0  1.4 B 3.4 % 
ρ = ρreal 1.4 B 3.9 % 
ρ = 0.99 1.4 B 5.5% 
The uncertainties in the market and in equipment prices can be combined with the 
uncertainties in the construction schedule. The causes of uncertainties in the component 
costs mainly lie in the uncertainty in the commodity prices and the uncertainty in the 
amount of labor needed to fabricate, assembly, or install the component. The analysis of 
the market variability informs about the uncertainty on the commodity prices, while the 
analysis of the stochastic nature construction activities gives information on the time and 
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the amount of labor needed to have the component fabricated, assembled, or installed. The 
construction schedule provides information on the cash flow profile and project duration, 
which can be used in calculating the interest during construction and, subsequently TCIC. 
Regarding the project schedule, a coefficient of correlation of 0.75 was used for activities 
in the same stage (r1 = 0.75), while activities in different stages were considered 
uncorrelated (r2 = 0). As before, the effect of these coefficient values on TCIC is later 
analyzed through sensitivity analysis. The simulation consists of the following steps: 
1. Sample the state of the market, based commodity prices distributions and 
correlations (both calculated through historical data); 
2. Sample activity durations, based on activity distributions and correlations between 
activities of same and different stages; 
3. Calculate labor costs of each activity, multiplying the hourly labor cost for the 
activity duration; 
4. Calculate project duration, OCC, TCIC. 
Under these assumptions, the TCIC mean value is $1.9 B, and its relative standard 
deviation is 8.0%. The cost contingency is $125.5 M, 6.6% of the TCIC mean. The mean 
project duration is 4.8 years, and its relative standard deviation is 7.8%. The resulting 
distributions of project duration, OCC and TCIC are shown in Figure 64. The results of the 




(a)                                        (b)                                    (c) 
Figure 64 – SMR project duration (a), OCC (b), and TCIC (c) distributions 
(r=10%) 
Table 37 –SMR results, considering market and durations uncertainties 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 4.8 1.5 B 1.9 B 
σ/µ 7.8% 7.0% 8.0% 
Mode 4.7 1.5 B 1.8 B 
75%   2.0 B 
Contingency   125.5 M 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  6.6% 
7.3 PWR12-BE 
The Monte Carlo simulations of PWR12-BE were run using the same approach 
used in Section 7.2.2. The prices of commodities and equipment (representing the “state” 
of the market) were sampled according to the correlations and distributions derived from 
the historical data. The activity durations were sampled according the distributions used 
for the SMR analysis (Section 7.1.3) and shown in Table 31.  
The results for PWR12-BE are shown in Figure 65 and Table 38. The project 
duration has a mean of 10.7 years, with a relative standard deviation of 16.2%. OCC has a 
mean of $5.6 B and a relative standard deviation of 7.5%, and the TCIC mean and relative 
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standard deviations are $6.8 B and 9.0%. In respect to the SMR, the PWR12-BE project 
duration has a higher relative standard deviation (16% vs 7.8%, Table 38). The OCC and 
TCIC relative standard deviations have the same order of magnitude as the SMR, the OCC 
one being slightly higher (7.5% versus 5.9 %) and TCIC one being slightly higher (9.0% 
versus 7.0%). The project contingency is $630.9 M, 9.3% of the TCIC expected value. 
 
(a)                                        (b)                                    (c) 
Figure 65 – PWR12-BE project duration (a), DC (b), and TCIC (c) distributions 
Table 38 – PWR12-BE results 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 10.7 5.5 B 6.7 B 
σ/µ 16.2% 7.5% 9.0% 
Mode 9.5 5.4 B 6.5 B 
75%   7.0 B 
Contingency   582.1 M 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  9.3% 
7.4 Modifying the model parameters to fit the historical data 
The historical data collected by the Energy Information Administration (1986) and 
presented in Section 2.3 shows that, before 1979, the NPP project durations and OCCs had 
a relative standard deviation of 19.3% and 36.5%, much higher than the ones obtained for 
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the SMR and the PWR12-BE. However, the SMR results are not comparable to the 
observed data, as the SMR is a new design built according to a novel methodology 
(modularization), while the historical trend refers to stick-built nuclear power plants. For 
this reason, the project duration and OCC means and relative standard deviations were 
compared to the results obtained for PWR12-BE, and not for the SMR.  
The relative standard deviation of the PWR12-BE project duration obtained 
through the Monte Carlo simulation is similar to the one calculated from historical data 
before the TMI event (pre-1979), which is 19.3%. However, the relative standard deviation 
of OCC is lower than the one observed in the same period, which is 36.5%. The reason of 
a lower OCC than that observed might lie in the unreliability of the commodity and 
equipment price trends that were used (the values of the correlation coefficients are 
reported in Appendix A). The data collected by the US Department of Labor shows very 
slight dispersions and correlations. However, this data includes prices collected from 
various industry, and most does not include data from the nuclear industry, as the 
production and sale of nuclear equipment in the US did not take place in the last decade. 
For this reason, the commodity and equipment prices data might not be reliable, and the 
recent construction of AP1000 units in the US might suggest that the actual prices (for 
nuclear components) are more dispersed and correlated than in other industries. 
As discussed in Section 2.3, the project duration standard deviation for the nuclear 
reactors built after 1979 is 22.8%, with a mean increase of a factor 1.8 in respect to the pre-
1979 phase. Regarding OCC, the observed data shows a relative standard deviation of 
42.5%; with a mean increase of a factor 2.7. The causes of this increase can be identified 
in the change in regulation that took place after the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. This 
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event is a good example of an unknown unknown that took place during the construction 
of plants completed after 1979 that, at the beginning and during construction, was not 
possible to forecast. The change in regulation caused an increase in commodity quantities 
and equipment prices that, if appropriately described today, can give insights on how to 
allocate allowances for unknown events.  
7.4.1.1 Pre-1979 data fitting (Case 1a and case 2a) 
Through the first approach, comparable OCC standard deviation to one observed 
before 1979 was obtained keeping the original correlation coefficients and modifying only 
the dispersion of the price and duration distributions. In this case, as variable are less 
correlated, the distributions need to be broadened using factors d1 = 8.9 and d2 = 1.28. 
Results are shown in Figure 66 and Table 39. In this case, the TCIC expected value is $2.5 
B, and the project contingency is $1.0 B, which corresponds to 40.0% of the TCIC expected 
value. In absolute terms, this value is 1.72 times higher than the one obtained before 
modifying the inputs. 
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Figure 66 – PWR12-BE distributions, with pre-1979 modified inputs (case 1a) 
Table 39 – PWR12-BE results, with pre-1979 modified inputs (case 1a) 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 7.6 2.2 B 2.5 B 
σ/µ 19.5% 30.2% 29.0% 
Mode 6.9 1.7 B 2.0 B 
75%   3.0 B 
Contingency   1.0 B 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  40.0% 
Through the second approach, similar results were also obtained increasing the 
prices correlation coefficients to 0.99 and the activities correlation coefficients to 0.99. 
Values of d1 and d2 were incrementally increased, and the historical data was matched 
using values d1 = 5.44 and d2 = 1.09. The results of this case are shown in Table 40, and 
the project duration, OCC and TCIC distributions are shown in Figure 67. The TCIC 
expected value is $2.5 B, and the project contingency is $729.7 M (29.2% of the TCIC 
expected value). In this case, the project contingency is 1.37 times higher than the one 
obtained before modifying the inputs. 
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Figure 67 – PWR12-BE distributions with pre-modified inputs (case 2a) 
Table 40 – PWR12-BE results with pre-1979 modified inputs (case 2a) 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 7.6 2.2 B 2.5 B 
σ/µ 19.5% 30.2% 30.2% 
Mode 5.9 B 1.9 B 2.3 B 
75%   3.0 B 
Contingency   729.7 M 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  29.2% 
7.4.1.2 Post-1979 data fitting (Case 1b and case 2b) 
To simulate the increase in cost and duration relative standard deviations, the 
parameters a and b were modified through the use of the parameter d1 and d2 (Eq. 43,44). 
Results comparable to the observed data were obtained for values of d1 = 13.28 and d2 = 
1.65. The increase in the price and duration modes cause an increase in both project 
duration and OCC that, combined to the use of values i1 = 2.23 and i2 = 1.6, matches the 
observed increases in duration and OCC. The results of this case are reported in Table 41 
and the distributions are shown in Figure 68.  
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Figure 68 – PWR12-BE distributions, with post-1979 modified inputs (case 1b) 
Table 41 – PWR12-BE results, with post-1979 modified inputs (case 1b) 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 13.2 5.1 B 6.5 B 
σ/µ 23.2% 42.3% 39.3 % 
Mode 11.8 3.8 B 5.1 B 
75%   8.2 B 
Contingency   3.1 B 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  47.0% 
A scenario similar to the historical scenario was obtained by increasing the 
correlation coefficients between prices to ⍴	= 0.99. d1 = 8.1, i1 = 2.29. Regarding the project 
duration, values of d2 = 1.38 i2 = 1.71 were used. In this scenario, the project contingency 
is $9.3 B, 46.3% of the expected TCIC value of $20.2 B (Table 42). The high relative 
contingency is due to the higher skewness of the TCIC distribution. Under the assumption 
that the unknown unknown of a regulatory change during construction has the effects 
shown by the historical data, the expected TCIC is 3 times higher ($20.1 B vs $6.7 B) and 
is the project contingency is 4 times higher ($9.3 B versus $2.3 B) than expected. 
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Figure 69 – PWR12-BE distributions, with post-1979 modified inputs (case 2b) 
Table 42 – PWR12-BE results, with post-1979 modified inputs (case 2b) 
µ 13.2 5.1 B 6.4 B 
σ/µ 23.2% 42.3% 41.7 % 
Mode 9.9 4.1 B 5.2 B 
75%   8.2 B 
Contingency   2.99 B 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  46.4% 
7.4.1.3 Hybrid approach (case 3a and case 3b) 
A more realistic approach consists of increasing the price correlation coefficients 
and distribution broadness, and increasing the duration distribution broadness, while 
keeping the activity duration correlations unchanged. This approach was denoted as 
“hybrid approach”, and was used to calibrate the model inputs in order to fit the pre-1979 
data (case 3a) and post-1979 data (case 3b). This case reflects the scenario where the 
activity durations given as input are more broad than expected, and the prices are more 
broad and more correlated than the ones extracted from US Department of Labor (2017b, 
2017c). In fact, the historical prices data refers to the last 10 years and, therefore, and does 
not include nuclear data. For case 3a, acceptable results were obtained for d1 = 6.98 and d2 
= 1.27. The results show a TCIC mean of $2.2 B and cost contingency of $995.5 M (Table 
43), corresponding to 39.8% to the expected TCIC. 
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Table 43 – PWR12-BE results, with pre-1979 modified inputs (case 3a) 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 7.6 2.2 B 2.5 B 
σ/µ 19.5% 30.2% 29.7% 
Mode 6.7 1.9 B 2.1 B 
75%   3.1 B 
Contingency   995.5 M 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  39.8% 
For case 3b, the observed data was described using d1 = 10.55, i1 = 2.23, d2 = 1.65, 
i2 = 1.6. The expected TCIC is $6.5 B, and the project contingency is $3.2 B, 49.2% of the 
expected TCIC (Table 46). The presence of unknown unknowns causes an increase in 
TCIC mean of a factor 2.6, which results in the need to allocate a project contingency 3.9 
times higher than the base case without unknown unknowns. The probability distributions 
obtained through Monte Carlo simulations for case 3a and 3b are shown in Figure 70, 
Figure 71 and Figure 72. 
Table 44 – PWR12-BE results, with post-1979 modified inputs (case 3b) 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 13.2 2.1 B 6.5 B 
σ/µ 23.2% 42.3% 40.7% 
Mode 6.8 3.9 B 5.1 B 
75%   8.2 B 
Contingency   3.2 B 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  49.2% 
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(a)              (b) 
Figure 70 – Comparison between pre-1979 (a) and post-1979 (b) project duration 
distributions (case 3a and case 3b) 
 
(a)              (b) 
Figure 71 – Comparison between pre-1979 (a) and post-1979 (b) OCC distributions 




(a)              (b) 
Figure 72 – Comparison between pre-1979 (a) and post-1979 (b) TCIC distributions 
(case 3a and case 3b) 
7.4.2 SMR 
The SMR construction was further analyzed updating the model inputs, using the 
probability distributions and correlations derived through the comparison between the 
PWR12 and the US historical data. The scenario with only known unknowns was simulated 
under the assumptions of case 3, with the parameters obtained in matching the PWR12-BE 
results to the historical data (d1 = 7.02, d2 = 1.28). The results of this scenario are reported 
in Table 45. Under these assumptions, the TCIC expected value is $1.9 B, with a 
contingency of $798.5 M, representing 42.0% of the expected TCIC. As compared to the 
results obtained for PWR12-BE, for the SMR the TCIC relative contingency is higher 
(42.0% versus 39.9%). It is in regard to the construction time that the benefits of SMR 
modular construction are revealed. The SMR relative standard deviation of the construction 
duration is 10% lower than that of the PWR12-BE (9.5% versus 19.5%). 
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Table 45 – SMR results with pre-1979 modified inputs (case 3a) 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 5.1 1.5 B 1.9 B 
σ/µ 9.5% 32.3% 32.7 % 
Mode 5.0 1.3 B 1.6 B 
75%   2.4 B 
Contingency   798.5 M 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  42.0% 
The scenario with the unknown unknown representing the change of regulation 
during construction was simulated d1 = 10.55, i1 = 2.23, d2 = 1.65, i2 = 1.6. The results 
show a TCIC mean of $4.5 B and cost contingency of $2.4 B (Table 46), corresponding to 
53.3% of the expected TCIC. For the SMR, the cost contingency corresponds to 126% of 
the pre-1979 TCIC mean. As in case 3a, as compared to the PWR12-BE, the SMR TCIC 
relative standard deviation is 5.1% higher (45.8% against 40.7%), while the duration 
standard deviation is about half (11.5% against 23.2%). For the SMR, the increase in mean 
project duration is very small: from 5.1 years to 5.4, which corresponds to an increase of 
5.9%, much lower than the one calculated from the historical data. The probability 
distributions obtained through Monte Carlo simulations for case 3a and 3b are shown in 
Figure 73, Figure 74 and Figure 75.  
Table 46 – SMR results, with post-1979 modified inputs (case 3b) 
 Duration 
(years) 
OCC ($) TCIC ($) 
µ 5.4 3.6 B 4.5 B 
σ/µ 11.5% 45.3% 45.8 % 
Mode 5.3 2.8 B 3.5 B 
75%   5.9 B 
Contingency   2.4 B 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
  53.3% 
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(a)         (b) 
Figure 73 – Comparison between TCIC distributions, without (a) and with (b) 
accounting for unknown-unknowns 
 
(a)         (b) 
Figure 74 – Comparison between TCIC distributions, without (a) and with (b) 




(a)         (b) 
Figure 75 – Comparison between TCIC distributions, without (a) and with (b) 
accounting for unknown-unknowns 
The PWR12-BE and the SMR results obtained to fit the pre-1979 and post-1979 
observed data are summarized in Table 47 and Table 48, respectively. The comparison 
between the SMR and PWR12-BE results suggests that modularization provides large 
benefits in the reduction of the uncertainty in the project duration. This fact might be in the 
diversification of stages in construction, since activities belonging to different stages are 
not correlated. However, regarding the predictability of TCIC and the cost contingency 
estimate, modularization does not lead to any improvements.  
Table 47 – Comparison between PWR12-BE and SMR results (pre-1979) 
  PWR12-BE SMR 
Duration 
(years) 
µ 7.6 5.1 
σ/µ 19.5% 9.5% 
TCIC 
($) 
µ 2.5 B 1.9 B 
σ/µ 29.7% 32.7 % 
Contingency  995.5 M 798.5 M 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
 39.8% 42.0% 
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Table 48 – Comparison between PWR12-BE and SMR results (post-1979) 
  PWR12-BE SMR 
Duration 
(years) 
µ 13.2 5.4 
σ/µ 23.2% 11.5% 
TCIC 
($) 
µ 6.5 B 4.5 B 
σ/µ 40.7% 45.8 % 
Contingency  3.2 B 2.4 B 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
 49.2% 53.3% 
 
7.4.3 Cost contingency of an NPP fleet 
The results obtained from the cases without and with unknown unknowns can lead 
to a more accurate cost contingency estimate for the construction of a series of NPPs. In 
case a “nuclear renaissance” takes place in the US, a fleet of NPPs would be built, with 
reactors built at different times over a timeframe of decades. In this scenario, the realization 
of an unknown-unknown during construction wouldn’t affect the whole fleet, but only the 
NPPs under construction whenever the unpredictable event takes place. In this case, the 
cost contingency of a single plant would be the cost contingency of the whole fleet divided 
by the number of plants. The contingency of the whole fleet is the summation of the cost 
contingency of each power plant, where the contingency of the NPPs completed before the 
unknown event is the one calculated without unknown unknowns (case 3a) and the 
contingency of the NPPS under construction at the time of the unknown event is calculated 
taking into account the unknown event (case 3b). Naming as p the fraction of NPPs affected 
by the unknown event, p also represents the probability of the unknown event to occur. 
Since the value of the parameter p is an unknown unknown, and not knowable a priori, the 
value of the parameter has to be decided by the decision maker. In this work, a sensitivity 
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analysis of the overall cost contingency for the whole fleet was conducted as a function of 
p. 
Cost contingency as a function of p was calculated for the case where the fleet under 
construction is made of PWR12 type plants only, and the case where the fleet is made of 
SMRs only. The trends are shown in Figure 76, and show a linear dependency of the cost 
contingency on p. The cost contingencies for p equal to 0% correspond to the one calculated 
in case 3a (without unknown unknowns) and the cost contingencies for p equal to 100% 
correspond to the one calculated in case 3b (with unknown unknowns). Therefore, the 
PWR12 contingency trend is higher and steeper than that of the SMR. As an example, 
considering p=20%, implying that unknown unknowns will affect 20% of the plants, the 
PWR12 contingency becomes $1.4 B, and the SMR cost contingency becomes $1.1 B. 
 






















This work describes the implementation of a methodological approach that was 
developed to evaluate uncertainties and risks in the construction of nuclear power plants. 
The historical Overnight Capital Cost (OCC) trends in the US, France, Canada, West 
Germany, Japan, and South Korea were analyzed. The trends in costs have varied 
significantly by era, country, and experience. While the observed data shows an important 
cost escalation for countries such as the US and West Germany, a much milder cost 
escalation is present for France, Canada, and Japan. The Republic of Korea is the only good 
example of learning-by-doing, with a significant cost decline over time. In the US, two 
trends can be identified. Nuclear reactors that were completed before the Three Mile Island 
accident of March 1979 show a small standard deviation of OCC and project durations, 
with a relatively small cost escalation. The reactors that were under construction in 1979 
and were completed after the accident, were subjected to an important cost and project 
duration escalations, with higher standard deviations. This phenomenon was mainly due to 
the change in regulation that took place after the 1979 event and affected the plants that 
were under construction.  
The economics of a traditional four-loop Westinghouse PWR plant is described. 
Costs for that plant were prepared in 1978 by the Department of Energy (DOE) Energy 
Economics Data Base (EEDB), averaging actual cost incurred in the construction of several 
nuclear power plants (NPP), itemized with a great level of detail according to the Code of 
Accounts. This best estimate costs are denoted PWR12-BE. For each account, the costs of 
equipment, site labor and site material are provided. Industry experts at Westinghouse 
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Electric Company performed a “sanity check” of the cost items, adjusting the cost of 
several items to match the current market and supply chain data.  
A deterministic methodology that produces a construction schedule and cash flow 
profile given a PBS of an NPP is presented. The methodology is based on a bottom-up 
approach and was used to calculate TCIC for the Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor. 
Construction is dependent on a number of variables, e.g. construction location, quantity 
and cost of labor and materials. The construction of the WEC-SMR nuclear island was 
described categorizing modules by the action they perform (type) and using typical labor 
rates, activities durations and costs for each module type. The model was applied to assess 
and compare different construction strategies for the Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor 
(WEC-SMR) nuclear island and was used to demonstrate and quantify the benefits of 
modularization. With a 10% discount rate, it was shown that the use of off-site factories to 
produce modules can reduce TCIC by 23.64%. Furthermore, EVAL showed that the 
adoption of an on-site assembly area to build super modules brings an additional 8.26% 
decrease in TCIC. Adopting full modularization, TCIC is 29.95% lower than if the nuclear 
island is built adopting stick-built construction. It was also shown how TCIC changes if 
higher discount rates are considered. Under the conservative assumption that 
manufacturing and construction of the portion of NPP other than nuclear island does not 
allow any type of modularization, the TCIC savings are about 15%. Under this 
methodology, the construction schedule of an NPP is generated from the NPP Part 
Breakdown Structure using an as-late-as-possible logic between activities, considering 
deterministic inputs (durations and costs of activities). Despite this logic provides a lower 
TCIC, due to the delaying of cash flows, it increases project risks, in case delays affect 
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activities on the critical path.  TCIC sensitivities on the discount rate and the 1-3-8 rule 
were analyzed. The analysis was extended to assess cost reduction if additional relocation 
of activities from the NPP construction site to off-site factories is feasible. The availability 
of barge transportation allows bigger pieces of equipment, which in the case of a modular 
reactor are called super modules, to be fabricated in a factory. Manufacturing super 
modules off-site allows labor to be moved from the site to the factory, with subsequent 
reduction in total labor required for the NPP to be built. This paper describes extending the 
EVAL methodology that allowed us to quantify the benefits of manufacturing super 
modules off-site. Based on the assumptions on the 1-3-8 rule and on the reduction of the 
number of composite modules, EVAL predicted a TCIC reduction up to 18% for the 
reference SMR. The deterministic analysis provides significant insights into the main 
contributors to the project costs and is able to support decisions in managing construction 
and reducing costs. However, the deterministic analyses highlighted the importance of 
extending the methodology to include stochastic capabilities through Monte Carlo 
simulations in order to estimate project risks, TCIC uncertainties, and costs escalation.  
Costs were generated to represent an artificial standard SMR, consisting of two 
units, for a total power level of 600 MWe. A stochastic analysis through Monte Carlo 
simulations is performed for the generic SMR and PWR12-BE, with the objective of 
estimating uncertainties in project costs and time. Furthermore, accurate predictions in the 
TCIC distribution can provide a correct estimate of the cost contingency. The approach is 
based on the correlated sampling through the Iman-Conover method. A double-step 
approach was used, where correlations between main equipment and commodity prices 
were accounted based on historical data, as well as correlations between activities in the 
 145 
construction stage. The results show a more accurate estimate and an improved prediction 
of TCIC uncertainty as correlations between variables are taken into account. However, a 
comparison between the resulting OCC uncertainty for the PWR12-BE and the historical 
data on nuclear reactor constructions in the US shows that the model underestimates cost 
uncertainty. For this reason, the probability distributions and the correlation matrix were 
modified in order for the results to represent the observed data. The inputs were first 
modified for the PWR12-BE to represent the historical construction cost and project 
duration in the pre-1979 phase to represent the expected standard deviations in a stable era, 
with no regulatory changes and no unforecastable events taking place. The inputs were 
later modified for the PWR12-BE to describe the cost escalation and the increase in 
standard deviations of cost and project duration in the post-1979 phase. The difference in 
the inputs represents the contribution of the unknown unknown describing the unexpected 
regulatory change during construction (and possible other unexpected events). Updated 
inputs were then applied to the SMR construction to estimate project duration, OCC and 
TCIC distributions and calculate cost contingency. The comparison between the results 
obtained for the SMR and the PWR12-BE show the difference in time and cost 
distributions between stick construction and modularization. The results, with and without 
unknown unknowns, for both PWR12-BE and SMR are summarized in Table 49.  With the 
inputs derived from the pre-1979 data, the TCIC mean value for the PWR12-BE is $2.5 B, 
with a contingency of $995.5 M, which corresponds to 39.8% of the TCIC mean. Similar 
results were obtained for the SMR, where cost contingency is 42.0% of the TCIC expected 
value. Regarding the project duration, the SMR relative standard deviation is 9.5%, 10% 
lower than that of the PWR12-BE. If the unknown unknowns are taken into account, the 
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PWR12-BE TCIC mean value increases to $6.5 B, while the cost contingency increases to 
$3.2 B, 49.2% of the TCIC expected value. The cost contingency is 128% of the TCIC 
mean derived for the pre-1979 case. For the SMR, TCIC increases to 4.5 B, while the cost 
contingency relative to the TCIC mean increases to $2.4 B, which corresponds to 126% of 
the pre-1979 TCIC mean. However, the construction time relative standard deviation for 
the SMR is 11.5%, about half than that of the PWR12-BE (23.2%). As the results show, 
there is no substantial difference between the TCIC relative standard deviation resulting 
from stick construction and modularization. However, the adoption of modularization 
provides a significant reduction in the standard deviation of the project duration, reducing 
the uncertainty in the construction time.  
Table 49 – PWR and SMR results summary (with and without unknown unknowns) 
  w/o w/ 
  PWR SMR PWR SMR 
Duration 
(years) 
µ 7.6 5.1 13.2 5.4 
σ/µ 19.5 9.5% 23.2 11.5% 
TCIC 
($) 
µ 2.5 B 1.9 B 6.5 B 4.5 B 
σ/µ 29.7% 32.7% 40.7% 45.8% 
Contingency  995.5 M 798.5 M 3.2 B 2.4 B 
Contingency/ 
µTCIC 
 39.8% 42.0% 49.2% 53.3% 
The cost contingency of a NPPs being part of a fleet was calculated, simulating the 
case of a “nuclear renaissance”. If the construction of a NPP fleet takes place in the US, 
the cost contingency of each plant will depend on the cost contingency of the other NPPs 
of the fleet, and therefore on the fraction of NPPs affected by the unknown unknown. In 
this case, the cost contingency of the plants was calculated as a function of the fraction of 
plants (p) affected by the unpredictable event, for both the PWR12 and the SMR. As 
compared to the SMR, the PWR12 presents a steeper cost contingency as a function of p. 
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For a fraction of plants affected by unknown unknowns equal to 20%, the cost 
contingencies for the PWR12 and the SMR are $1.4 B and $1.1 B, respectively. 
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APPENDIX A. HISTORICAL PRICES DATA 
Table 50 – CPI (extracted from US Department of Labor (2017a)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 203.7557 207.6623 208.2353 209.7163 
2008 212.1003 216.7567 219.2777 213.0753 
2009 212.015 214.263 215.718 216.152 
2010 217.0197 218.0507 218.254 218.8977 
2011 221.6663 225.5307 226.452 226.1077 
2012 227.9067 229.7927 230.2967 230.3797 
2013 231.7397 232.9933 233.874 233.2213 
2014 234.9967 237.7717 238.0443 236.132 
2015 234.8493 237.6807 238.305 237.233 
2016 237.3863 240.1783 240.976 241.5047 
2017 243.4143 244.6285   
 
Table 51 – Total compensation for Private industry workers in All industries and 
occupations, 3-month percent change (x1, extracted from US Department of Labor 
(2017b)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 1.19464 1.18271 1.18889 1.19112 
2008 1.18598 1.16863 1.16212 1.20193 
2009 1.21036 1.20005 1.19673 1.20029 
2010 1.20267 1.20297 1.20665 1.20792 
2011 1.19999 1.18886 1.18876 1.19533 
2012 1.19183 1.18796 1.1901 1.19324 
2013 1.19335 1.19287 1.19313 1.20245 
2014 1.19695 1.19244 1.19941 1.21517 
2015 1.23036 1.2157 1.21979 1.23143 
2016 1.23802 1.23097 1.23303 1.23648 
2017 1.2366    
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Table 52 – Nonmetallic mineral products, hydraulic cement (x2, extracted from US 
Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 246.002 246.241 245.673 244.598 
2008 240.745 234.959 232.307 238.303 
2009 239.739 237.832 231.188 227.501 
2010 222.529 216.128 213.183 210.264 
2011 205.488 203.435 203.5 198.547 
2012 200.998 201.88 201.72 201.612 
2013 206.824 208.069 207.528 208.421 
2014 208.162 213.762 214.468 217.271 
2015 226.454 229.956 229.179 230.045 
2016 236.581 238.077 239.236 237.974 
2017 241.728    
 
Table 53 – Metals and metal products (x3, extracted fromUS Department of Labor 
(2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 234.909 241.801 235.023 230.199 
2008 247.736 300.636 318.009 243.315 
2009 212.602 192.37 209.714 218.365 
2010 237.583 260.23 248.788 249.089 
2011 270.86 276.546 275.348 270.719 
2012 271.259 261.299 245.691 240.34 
2013 238.506 234.026 233.418 238.204 
2014 242.583 238.547 237.897 233.372 
2015 219.522 204.174 197.586 180.459 
2016 177.722 192.297 194.763 191.755 
2017 207.9    
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Table 54 – Fabricated structural metal bar joists and concrete reinforcing bars (x4, 
extracted from US Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 208.829 208.9902 209.9034 210.0171 
2008 212.9528 225.3442 229.2818 231.0527 
2009 223.2156 211.6261 203.7966 199.6489 
2010 198.2111 194.8055 194.8859 194.3497 
2011 195.6427 193.4817 193.5596 192.3734 
2012 192.9648 194.5792 192.0275 192.4214 
2013 191.2962 190.3306 190.1026 190.4598 
2014 190.6167 191.3072 192.8716 194.5748 
2015 195.4306 194.7101 195.5006 193.8065 
2016 192.7535 196.1151 196.6871 196.864 
2017 198.0001    
 
Table 55 – Sheet metal work mfg (x5, extracted from US Department of Labor 
(2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 136.7712 134.1165 133.746 132.8023 
2008 132.3839 131.3167 130.2112 133.7103 
2009 133.4137 130.4437 129.3337 129.3758 
2010 129.0468 128.9974 133.2484 134.1259 
2011 132.7865 130.7601 130.5164 130.4621 
2012 128.8267 127.802 127.3471 127.1239 
2013 127.6811 127.3072 126.7229 126.9026 
2014 126.4309 125.6403 125.9764 127.2755 
2015 130.4691 129.4313 128.303 128.643 
2016 128.5943 127.0659 126.9827 127.1777 
2017 126.4819    
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Table 56 – HVAC and commercial refrigeration equipment (x6, extracted from US 
Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 139.6508 138.4375 138.7994 139.2199 
2008 138.5835 137.0321 139.6991 144.1688 
2009 144.4851 141.7903 140.1871 139.981 
2010 139.1589 138.5375 139.2309 138.933 
2011 139.1128 138.3199 139.4148 140.4208 
2012 140.8867 139.9074 139.1775 139.7313 
2013 140.4914 140.367 140.0126 140.6144 
2014 140.6639 140.0506 140.0613 141.6482 
2015 143.0448 141.5477 141.4487 142.7418 
2016 143.1297 141.6035 141.5058 141.5001 
2017 141.6292    
 
Table 57 – Metal tanks and vessels, custom fabricated and field erected (x7, 
extracted from US Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 249.2176 250.7907 250.098 247.2436 
2008 251.337 255.3901 254.4322 259.2898 
2009 260.4145 243.9231 236.7722 235.5032 
2010 234.5625 233.4525 233.2351 229.3112 
2011 220.3786 216.5954 215.03 213.9851 
2012 212.2638 210.6244 208.1515 207.0798 
2013 206.2182 203.497 201.8556 204.8705 
2014 207.1788 206.985 207.0582 206.6295 
2015 206.8943 203.2942 202.1082 201.8877 
2016 201.0016 199.1066 199.191 199.2621 
2017 199.6428    
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Table 58 – Metal tank, heavy gauge, mfg (x8, extracted from US Department of 
Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 155.7028 155.6813 156.4288 156.5304 
2008 157.4207 160.699 163.4722 168.8997 
2009 168.3797 162.5069 159.3229 158.8136 
2010 156.8636 157.5056 157.3964 156.6361 
2011 153.9117 150.7998 151.518 152.9031 
2012 152.3059 152.1913 153.1709 154.5325 
2013 153.482 153.1822 150.93 152.5424 
2014 153.8876 153.3968 153.6321 155.0519 
2015 155.3099 152.3947 151.2734 150.6165 
2016 150.3476 148.5656 148.5813 135.9265 
2017 135.9324    
 
Table 59 – Steel product mfg from purchased steel (x9, extracted from US 
Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 180.4518 179.254 178.0542 175.5139 
2008 184.5161 214.1507 236.2446 227.0873 
2009 193.518 173.4073 172.933 176.0234 
2010 182.1164 192.86 192.7559 190.6603 
2011 201.6446 210.5193 206.4923 205.4703 
2012 205.5688 202.5651 196.5317 193.1635 
2013 189.8527 186.6557 186.0899 186.8562 
2014 186.1079 184.5834 184.818 185.7288 
2015 181.8584 170.0062 165.7525 160.6202 
2016 158.9389 162.7888 166.9298 163.9293 
2017 171.6542    
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Table 60 – Pump and compressor manufacturing (x10, extracted from US 
Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 139.4096 138.8692 139.1131 139.2203 
2008 140.1559 138.2023 139.2904 144.6694 
2009 146.5999 145.368 144.9142 144.7364 
2010 144.6466 144.4487 144.9496 144.8958 
2011 145.8127 144.4689 144.7817 145.4714 
2012 146.3977 146.3334 146.2633 146.0673 
2013 147.0395 147.4747 146.919 147.5752 
2014 148.6142 147.29 147.7379 149.6979 
2015 151.6263 150.2994 150.0069 150.995 
2016 152.1345 150.1629 149.5968 149.5732 
2017 149.6396    
 
Table 61 – Power boiler and heat exchanger mfg (x11, extracted from US 
Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 163.1948 162.3597 160.7772 160.3812 
2008 160.7685 164.3189 170.6899 174.5166 
2009 173.0367 163.5073 159.3601 158.474 
2010 158.4423 163.1549 163.9747 163.8653 
2011 164.3964 165.6994 167.728 167.8046 
2012 167.0544 166.4623 166.4895 166.4997 
2013 166.6125 166.9067 167.0452 167.3027 
2014 166.1086 165.4742 165.4554 168.322 
2015 171.6336 169.589 169.4509 172.4868 
2016 171.276 170.8461 170.9241 170.7525 
2017 169.7481    
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Table 62 – Iron and steel pipes and tubes, purchased iron and steel (x12, extracted 
from US Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 284.2751 281.3158 277.2868 272.3369 
2008 289.6048 338.5817 364.895 358.3475 
2009 297.376 260.5366 260.1341 272.0748 
2010 289.0867 315.5719 318.3806 317.2948 
2011 342.7802 358.4258 348.7883 349.282 
2012 352.8633 347.4412 333.1618 330.8097 
2013 320.3619 311.4789 312.4982 313.0943 
2014 311.259 307.9231 306.0311 308.3056 
2015 302.1956 277.0332 268.3792 258.0034 
2016 256.0216 264.6431 267.0374 259.9638 
2017 277.3538    
 
Table 63 – Metal valve mfg (x13, extracted from US Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 149.2987 148.4528 150.1998 149.9563 
2008 150.3479 148.9649 149.4454 155.1621 
2009 157.4114 155.8765 154.9357 154.8888 
2010 155.1341 155.1859 155.0788 155.1445 
2011 155.7838 155.5732 156.7048 158.5682 
2012 158.6422 158.475 158.7327 160.0913 
2013 159.9608 159.5193 159.6155 160.7621 
2014 161.3192 159.8476 159.8351 161.7548 
2015 163.192 162.0719 162.2279 163.4086 
2016 164.1611 162.9678 162.5286 162.6119 
2017 161.9398    
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Table 64 – Turbine and power transmission equipment mfg (x14, extracted from US 
Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 182.9707 180.474 178.9157 178.3527 
2008 179.6513 179.7862 185.1604 196.4045 
2009 201.2378 198.7463 199.2569 197.7623 
2010 197.1233 195.5165 195.5959 195.3936 
2011 194.837 193.1193 192.5141 192.9157 
2012 191.3259 190.5676 190.6141 190.8981 
2013 190.1326 189.8051 189.6483 190.7389 
2014 189.7165 188.1528 188.245 190.4991 
2015 191.85 190.0458 189.8191 190.781 
2016 187.7024 185.0791 184.4655 184.1965 
2017 183.2885    
 
Table 65 – Fabricated heat exchangers and steam condensers (except for nuclear 
applications) (x15, extracted from US Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 352.7336 350.0934 344.5114 344.5295 
2008 343.8128 346.555 353.6152 357.1728 
2009 357.6517 348.974 339.8597 337.4413 
2010 337.0711 346.4753 343.5739 342.4144 
2011 340.1719 336.1044 341.5416 348.8869 
2012 347.3502 345.8468 346.2268 346.4551 
2013 346.9543 346.5934 346.0544 347.8277 
2014 345.7906 343.9518 343.7963 351.0556 
2015 358.4487 354.2114 353.6224 364.7808 
2016 364.7173 362.6525 362.0586 361.4684 
2017 358.6334    
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Table 66 – Electrical equipment mfg (x16, extracted from US Department of Labor 
(2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 143.0522 141.7769 142.2467 142.4486 
2008 143.3083 142.7923 144.3867 148.5989 
2009 148.6385 147.2723 146.9935 147.8689 
2010 148.5555 149.2002 149.8087 150.1133 
2011 150.1162 149.3521 149.5373 149.5485 
2012 149.4453 148.1437 147.1486 147.2011 
2013 147.7116 146.9494 146.6747 147.5052 
2014 146.9839 145.0604 145.1333 146.1732 
2015 146.8677 144.7049 143.9478 144.1516 
2016 143.8176 142.4522 142.3861 142.2769 
2017 141.5965    
 
Table 67 – Mechanical power transmission equipment mfg (x17, extracted from US 
Department of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 230.0624 224.7864 227.2195 227.4026 
2008 226.9291 225.8057 237.1733 248.6595 
2009 255.9517 254.1857 252.503 252.2228 
2010 252.4181 251.0363 251.6619 252.9717 
2011 253.6075 250.5238 252.0258 255.9465 
2012 255.7907 254.7878 254.517 254.2507 
2013 256.1007 256.5051 255.3295 256.7786 
2014 254.0786 251.3508 252.0558 254.7242 
2015 258.0232 255.9786 256.1965 258.0431 
2016 257.3958 253.8267 252.7133 252.3963 
2017 252.4603    
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Table 68 – Elevator and moving stairway mfg (x18, extracted from US Department 
of Labor (2017c)) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 161.9116 160.2784 160.699 159.643 
2008 158.1568 156.4168 160.9036 167.1757 
2009 163.9936 161.1317 158.755 158.8893 
2010 158.1804 155.9718 155.789 154.9959 
2011 153.2448 154.525 153.8242 155.4292 
2012 154.5969 154.1081 154.0559 154.1416 
2013 154.0837 153.3916 154.348 156.0399 
2014 155.3485 154.6322 155.106 157.1948 
2015 158.7118 157.4378 157.1272 158.4927 
2016 159.4196 157.6351 157.2136 157.41 
2017 159.4258    
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